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Abstract—Due to the malicious attacks in wireless networks,
physical layer security has attracted increasing concerns from
both academia and industry. The research on physical layer
security mainly focuses either on the secrecy capacity/achievable
secrecy rate/capacity-equivocation region from the perspective
of information theory, or on the security designs from the
viewpoints of optimization and signal processing. Because of its
importance in security designs, the latter research direction is
surveyed in a comprehensive way in this paper. The survey
begins with typical wiretap channel models to cover common
scenarios and systems. The topics on physical-layer security
designs are then summarized from resource allocation, beam-
forming/precoding, and antenna/node selection and cooperation.
Based on the aforementioned schemes, the performance metrics
and fundamental optimization problems are discussed, which are
generally adopted in security designs. Thereafter, the state of the
art of optimization approaches on each research topic of physical
layer security is reviewed from four categories of optimization
problems, such as secrecy rate maximization, secrecy outrage
probability minimization, power consumption minimization, and
secure energy efficiency maximization. Furthermore, the impacts
of channel state information on optimization and design are
discussed. Finally, the survey concludes with the observations
on potential future directions and open challenges.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, optimization, resource
allocation, beamforming, precoding, cooperative transmission
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid evolution of information and communication
technologies, mobile Internet and Internet of things (IoT) have
become indispensable in daily life. As the foundation of these
networks, the cellular network has been designed to support
Internet connectivity and full interworking with heterogeneous
wireless access networks [1]. This fact, therefore, leads to
complicated network architectures, network topologies, access
technologies, service requirements, and mobile equipments
while bringing serious security issues in wireless information
transmission. How to guarantee the security of confidential
information has become the precondition to the commercial
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application of some emerging wireless networks and commu-
nication services. Therefore, the theories and technologies of
information security have attracted increasing concerns from
both academia and industry recently.
During last few decades, the information security mostly
depends on the cryptographic encryption and decryption meth-
ods which are deployed at the upper layers of protocol stack.
The encryption-based security technologies have been shown
to be effective in many cases, but their inherent vulnerabilities
are heavy computation and key management costs which may
result in high complexity and resource consumption [2]. As
an alternative security technology, the physical layer security,
based on the information theory framework, is to utilize
the inherent randomness of the physical medium and the
difference between the legitimate channels and the wiretap
channels to guarantee secure information transmission [3].
Compared with cryptographic approaches, as shown in Table
I, the physical layer security does not rely on the computing
capability of the communication equipments, and thus has
the advantages of lower complexity and resource savings. It
has been shown from the viewpoint of information theory
that the physical layer security can achieve perfect secrecy
even if the eavesdropper has very strong computing capability.
Besides, the physical layer security has a performance metric
for secrecy evaluation, i.e., equivocation rate which measures
the uncertainty of the confidential message at eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, by exploiting the physical layer features, this se-
curity technique can flexibly adjust transmission strategies and
parameters to accommodate the channel changes. In summary,
physical layer security presents distinctive advantages and
promising prospects. Therefore, the physical layer security can
be used as an effective supplementary for the cryptographic
techniques to further enhance information security.
The concept of secrecy communication was first proposed
in the pioneering work of Shannon in 1949 [4], in which
secrecy communication was investigated from the viewpoint of
information theory. It was proposed therein that the approach
termed “one-time pad” could achieve the perfect secrecy.
However, it was very difficult to apply this method in practice
due to the intractable difficulties of key generation and man-
agement. Being different from the Shannon’s model of secrecy
communication, Wyner proposed the wiretap channel model
in 1975 [5], in which the perfect secrecy could be achieved
at the physical layer by utilizing the difference between the
legitimate channel and the illegitimate channel without any
key. In Wyner’s wiretap channel model, the signal received by
the eavesdropper was a degraded version of the signal received
by the destination. The characteristic of signal degradation at
2TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENCRYPTION AND PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
Cryptographic encryption Physical layer security
Theoretical basis Cryptography Information theory
Secrecy level Can be deciphered by brute-force
computing
Achieving perfect secrecy
Computing ability requirements Heavily relying on the computing ability Being independent of computing ability
Encryption key management Heavy costs resulting from key generation,
management, and distribution
With no need of any key
Evaluation criterion Being unable to accurately assess the
leakage of confidential information
Evaluating secrecy precisely by equivocation rate
Adaptability to channel changes Poor channel adaptability Adjusting transmission strategies and parameters to
well adapt the channel changes
the eavesdropper made it possible to achieve secrecy at the
physical layer. It was also proved by Wyner that the secrecy
capacity of a discrete memoryless channel was the maximum
value of the difference between the mutual information of
the legitimate link and the mutual information of the wiretap
link. Thereafter, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner generalized the degraded
wiretap channel to broadcast channel with confidential mes-
sages, and analysed the secrecy capacity of a more general
(non-degraded) wiretap channel [6]. Following these works,
Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman investigated the Gaussian
wiretap channel and derived the secrecy capacity which is the
difference of legitimate channel capacity and wiretap channel
capacity [7]. Nevertheless, the early research work cannot
be applied directly, since the physical layer security needed
suitable secure coding schemes to match the channel states.
However, the secure coding technology was less developed
in early stage, and the theories and technologies on physical
layer security were thus believed to be impractical. Moreover,
the fact that the encryption-based security technologies held
a dominant position for a long time affected the development
of physical layer security. In recent decades, the encryption-
based security technologies have exposed some limitations
in practical applications. Meanwhile, the coding theories and
technologies have got a rapid development, which laid a solid
foundation of physical layer security. Accordingly, more and
more attentions have been paid on the physical layer security.
The studies on physical layer security can be roughly
summarized from two main aspects: 1) the studies related
to secrecy rate/capacity from the perspective of information-
theoretic security, 2) and the studies related to system designs
from the viewpoints of optimization and signal processing
[8]–[12]. The first aspect mainly focuses on the secrecy
capacity, achievable secrecy rate, and capacity-equivocation
region based on the ideas of information theory. On the
other hand, the second aspect mainly focuses on the secure
strategy designs based on the techniques of optimization and
signal processing. Because of the importance in practical
security designs, our objective in this survey is to provide
a comprehensive overview on the optimization and design of
secure physical layer transmission. The investigations on the
topic that we just mentioned are based on the framework of
information-theoretic security, since all involved performance
metrics, optimization problems, and security solutions in this
survey are intertwined with the secrecy rate/capacity which
are based on information theory.
Many excellent surveys have been published in physical
layer security, which provide comprehensive overviews and
insightful comments to understand the fundamental principles,
technology status, and future trends in this field. In [13], the
fundamentals and technologies of physical layer security are
reviewed comprehensively. Specifically, in [13], the technolo-
gies, challenges, and solutions are summarized from more
methodological viewpoints involving wiretap coding, multi-
antenna and relay cooperation, physical-layer key generation,
and physical-layer authentication. Moreover, we highlight the
focused issues and the main contents of some published
surveys in Table II. In contrast to existing surveys, our work
tries to review the recent advances in physical layer security
from the perspective of system optimization and design. First,
we summarize the research topics and the secure strategies
that cover extensive problems in system optimization and
design, such as secure resource allocation, signal processing
and cooperative diversity. Second, the performancemetrics and
the related optimization problem formulations are investigated
to provide deep insights into secure transmission designs.
Finally, we survey the state of the art of optimization and
design on each research topic of physical layer security from
four categories of basic optimization problems, i.e., maxi-
mization of achievable secrecy rate, minimization of secrecy
outrage probability, minimization of power consumption, and
maximization of secure energy efficiency (EE). In particular,
some optimization approaches and secure strategies which are
usually appeared in physical-layer transmission designs are
summarized with detailed procedures.
In summary, this survey provides a well-rounded overview
for newcomers to understand the optimization and design in
physical layer security. The contributions of this survey is
based on the following work: 1) Summarizing general wiretap
channel models to cover the basic scenarios in this field,
followed with usually appeared optimization approaches. 2)
Investigating hot topics in physical layer security from the
perspective of system optimization and design. 3) Seeking
deep insights into performance metrics to achieve different
requirements in system designs. 4) Reviewing the state of the
3TABLE II
BRIEF SUMMARIES ON EXISTING SURVEYS
Surveys Publications Focused issues Main contents
[1] IEEE Communications
Surveys & Tutorials
Security for long term evolution
(LTE) and LTE-advanced Networks.
Security functionalities, security vulnerabilities, and existing
security solutions.
[10] IEEE Communications
Surveys & Tutorials
Physical layer security in multiuser
wireless networks.
Security improvements in multi-antenna, broadcast,
multiple-access, interference, and relay channels, as well as
physical-layer key generation and secure coding.
[13] IEEE Communications
Surveys & Tutorials
Comprehensive overview on the
fundamentals and technologies of
physical layer security.
Technologies, challenges, and solutions in physical layer security
are studied from the aspects of wiretap coding, multi-antenna and
relay cooperation, physical-layer key generation, and physical-layer
authentication.
[11] Proceedings of the IEEE Lessons learned from
information-theoretic security with
multiple wireless transmitters.
Designing secure wireless systems with unauthenticated entities by
cooperative jamming/relaying and interference alignment.
[14] Proceedings of the IEEE Security vulnerabilities, security
threats, and efficient defense
mechanisms.
Discussing the security requirements and attacks at each protocol
layer, investigating the existing security protocols and algorithms,
while exploring the state of the art in physical layer security.
[15] Proceedings of the IEEE Physical layer security in the
Internet of Things.
Surveying the advances and challenges in resource constrained
secrecy coding and secret-key generation in the Internet of Things.
[8] IEEE Signal Processing
Magazine
Cooperative security at physical
layer.
Guaranteeing information security by using cooperative techniques
which consist of carefully designed coding and signaling schemes.
[9] IEEE Signal Processing
Magazine
Signal processing techniques for
secrecy in multi-antenna wireless
systems.
Enhancing physical layer security in multi-antenna systems by
beamforming/precoding with or without artificial noise.
[12] IEEE Communications
Magazine
Recent research on enhancing
secrecy via cooperation.
Signal design and optimization to increase secrecy based on
cooperative relaying and jamming.
[16] IEEE Communications
Magazine
A joint framework involving both
the physical layer and application
layer security technologies.
Proposing a joint security scheme by exploiting the security
capacity and signal processing technologies at the physical layer
and the authentication and watermarking strategies at the
application layer.
[17] IEEE Communications
Magazine
Physical layer security for massive
MIMO.
Discussing the passive eavesdropping and active attacks in massive
MIMO systems while proposing three detection schemes to
identify the active attacks.
[18] IEEE Communications
Magazine
Physical layer security in cooperative
relay networks.
Pure or hybrid relaying/jamming combinations for secrecy
improvements with trusted/untrusted relays.
[19] IEEE Communications
Magazine
Physical layer security in the 5G
network.
The opportunities and challenges offered by the disruptive
technologies enabling 5G for achieving high physical layer security.
[20] IEEE Communications
Magazine
Challenges of physical layer security
in practical applications.
Identifying the important issues to apply physical layer security
into practice.
[21] IEEE Wireless
Communications
Several prevalent methods to
enhance physical layer security.
Classifying the methods of physical layer security into five major
categories while comparing their reliability, computational
complexity, and secrecy capacity.
[22] IEEE Network Diversity techniques to improve
physical layer security.
Exploiting MIMO diversity, multiuser diversity, and cooperative
diversity to secure wireless communications.
art of optimization and design in this field and the harmful
impacts of channel state information (CSI) on designing
security solutions. 5) Discussing future possible directions and
open challenges.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, typical wiretap channel models and optimization
concepts are introduced to cover common communication
scenarios and optimization approaches. In Section III, the
research topics in physical layer security are investigated
from the perspective of secure resource allocation, beamform-
ing/procoding, and antenna/node selection and cooperation. In
Section IV, we seek deep insights into performance metrics
which can be adopted in all research topics to evaluate the
proposed secure transmission strategies. The state of the art of
optimization and design in physical layer security is reviewed
in Section V, followed with usually appeared optimization
approaches and security strategies. Section VI investigates the
common assumptions of CSI and their negative impacts on
secure transmission designs. Future possible directions and
open challenges are discussed In Section VII to provide some
lessons for newcomers. Finally, the survey is concluded in
Section VIII. A diagram is illustrated in Fig. 1 to show the
outline and structure of this paper. In addition, abbreviations
used in this paper are defined in Table III.
Notations: Throughout this paper, matrices and vectors are
denoted by bold uppercase letters and bold lowercase letters,
respectively. x denote the set of optimization variable without
physical meaning. Mutual information, conjugate transpose,
4TABLE III
ABBREVIATIONS AND THEIR DEFINITIONS
Abbreviation Definition
5G The fifth generation
AF Amplify-and-forward
AN Artificial noise
CSI Channel state information
CI Channel inversion
DC Difference of convex functions
DF Decode-and-forward
EE Energy efficiency
GSVD Generalized singular value decomposition
I/Q In-phase and quadrature
IoT Internet of things
LTE Long term evolution
MIMO Multiple-input multiple-output
MIMOME Multi-input multi-output multi-eavesdropper
MISO Multiple-input single-output
MISOME Multi-input single-output multi-eavesdropper
MRC Maximal ratio combining
MRT Maximum ratio transmission
mm-Wave Millimeter-wave
OFDMA Orthogonal frequency division multiple access
QoS Quality of service
RCI Regularized channel inversion
SISO Single-input single-output
SIMO Single-input multiple-output
SDP Semidefinite programming
SDR Semidefinite relaxation
SE Spectrum efficiency
SPCA Sequential parametric convex approximation
SNR Signal-to-noise ratio
SINR Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
S-DPC Secret dirty-paper coding
ZF Zero-forcing
and Euclidean norm are represented by I(·; ·), (·)H , and ‖ · ‖,
respectively. The trace of a matrix is denoted by Tr(). W  0
means that W is a positive semidefinite matrix.
II. FUNDAMENTALS
In this section, we give several typical wiretap channel mod-
els to cover the common scenarios and systems considered in
the survey, and introduce general concepts of optimization and
optimization problems to clarify the variables and parameters
in security designs.
A. Wiretap Channel Models
The typical wiretap channel models usually include
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels,
A survey of optimization approaches for wireless physical layer security
Section I: Introduction
Section II: Fundamentals
A. Wiretap channel models
B. Concepts of optimization
Section III: Research topics on system designs of physical layer security
A. Secure resource allocation
B. Secure beamforming and precoding
C. Antenna/node selection and cooperation
D. Joint strategies of several approaches
Section IV: Performance metrics and basic optimization problems in physical layer security
A. Secrecy rate/capacity
B. Secrecy outage probability/capacity
C. Power/energy consumption
D. Secure energy efficiency
Section V: The state of the art of optimization and design in physical layer security
A. Secure resource allocation
B. Secure beamforming and precoding
C. Antenna/node selection and cooperation
Section VI: The impacts of CSI on physical-layer security designs
A. The perfect CSI of all channels
B. The imperfect CSI of wiretap channels
C. The unknown CSI of wiretap channels
Section VII: Discussions on future directions and challenges
A. The influences of wireless channels
B. The impacts of adversary model
C. The influences of hardware impairments
D. The joint designs of physical layer security and classic cryptographic security
E. The global optimization with security, reliability, and throughput
F. The commercial application of physical layer security
Section VIII: Conclusions
Fig. 1. The structural diagram of this survey.
broadcast wiretap channels, multiple-access wiretap channels,
interference wiretap channels, and relay wiretap channels [10],
etc.
1) MIMO wiretap channels: The simplest network in phys-
ical layer security is composed of a transmitter, a legiti-
mate receiver, and an unauthorized receiver (eavesdropper),
in which confidential messages are exchanged between the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver while protecting from
the unauthorized receiver. In such a scenario, the terminals
may be equipped with multiple antennas. The typical chan-
nel model for multi-antenna scenarios is the MIMO wiretap
channel which can cover the special models of single-input
single-output (SISO), single-input multiple-output (SIMO),
and multiple-input single-output (MISO) channels. In the
MIMO channel in which the transmitter, receiver, and eaves-
dropper are deployed with nt, nd, and ne antennas, respec-
tively, the general expressions for the received signals at the
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are, respectively, given
by [10]
yd = Hdxs + zd, (1)
ye = Hexs + ze, (2)
where xs is the nt × 1 encoded signal with a covariance matrix
constraint E{xsxHs } = Qx for Qx  0 or an average power
constraint Tr{Qx} ≤ Pmax for a peak power Pmax. The
5nd × nt matrix Hd and the ne×nt matrix He are the channel
gain matrices to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper,
respectively. zd and ze are white Gaussian noise vectors at
the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, respectively. This
wiretap channel model is typical, and to be widely investigated
in physical layer security.
2) Broadcast wiretap channels: The broadcast wiretap
channels are raised in multi-user networks with more than two
receivers where one transmitter delivers confidential informa-
tion to multiple users with the presence of multiple eaves-
droppers. We assume that there are one transmitter equipped
with nt antennas, I users each with ndi antennas, and J
eavesdroppers each with nej antennas. In the downlink, the
transmitter transmits confidential messages to the legitimate
users while preventing from overhearing of the eavesdroppers.
This broadcast channel can be equivalent to a compound
wiretap channel which is defined as [3], [23]
ydi = Hdixs + zdi , i = 1, 2, · · · , I, (3)
yej = Hejxs + zej , j = 1, 2, · · · , J, (4)
where xs denotes the nt×1 encoded signal for the confidential
messages which is subject to a covariance matrix constraint
E{xsxHs } = Qx for Qx  0 or an average power constraint
Tr{Qx} ≤ Pmax for a peak power Pmax. ydi and yej are the
received signals at user i and eavesdropper j, respectively.Hdi
is ndi×nt channel matrix to user i and Hej is nej×nt channel
matrix to eavesdropper j. zdi and zej are white Gaussian
noise vectors at user i and eavesdropper j, respectively. The
compound wiretap channel has several special cases including
the parallel wiretap channel with two eavesdroppers, the
fading wiretap channel with multiple eavesdroppers, and the
wiretap channel with multiple receivers [3], etc. In addition,
another specific broadcast channel is the broadcast channel
with separate confidential messages of each user in which
each downlink message must be kept secret from all other
unintended users (each user is seen as an eavesdropper for
messages not intended to it) [10].
3) Multiple-access wiretap channels: In the multiple-access
wiretap channel, multiple transmitters transmit messages to
a legitimate receiver with the existence of an eavesdropper.
There are K transmitters each with ntk antennas, one legit-
imate receiver with nd antennas, and one eavesdropper with
ne antennas. Let us define nd×ntk matrix Hdk and ne×ntk
matrix Hek as the channel matrices from transmitter k to the
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Then, the received
signals at the receiver and the eavesdropper are, respectively,
expressed as [24]
yd =
K∑
k=1
Hdkxsk + zd, (5)
ye =
K∑
k=1
Hekxsk + ze, (6)
where xsk denotes the ntk × 1 encoded signal at transmitter
k with a covariance matrix constraint or an average power
constraint. zd and ze are the white Gaussian noise vectors at
the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. Some special
cases of multiple-access channel in physical layer security
are also investigated, such as SISO multiple-access channel
with an eavesdropper [25] and multiple-access channel with
common and confidential messages [3].
4) Interference wiretap channels: The interference wiretap
channel refers to the scenario where multiple links are simulta-
neously active in the same time and frequency slot, and hence
potentially interfere with each other [26]. At the same time,
the communications over the multiple links are overheard by
an eavesdropper. We consider the interference wiretap channel
with K user pairs and an eavesdropper, where the source user
k, the destination user k, and the eavesdropper are deployed
with ntk , ndk , and ne antennas, respectively, k = 1, · · · ,K .
The received signals of destination user k and the eavesdropper
are, respectively, written as [27]
ydk = Hdkkxsk +
K∑
l 6=k
Hdklxsl + zdk , (7)
ye =
K∑
l=1
Helxsl + ze, (8)
where xsl is the ntl × 1 transmitted signal of source user
l with a covariance matrix constraint or an average power
constraint. The ndk × ntl matrix Hdkl denotes the channel
matrix from source user l to destination user k. The ne × ntl
matrix Hel denotes the channel matrix from source user l to
the eavesdropper. zdk and ze are the white Gaussian noise
vectors at destination user k and the eavesdropper, respectively.
A further model of interest is the interference channel with
separate confidential messages, in which each source message
must be kept confidential from all other unintended users. A
specific case of this channel model is studied in [3] where
SISO interference channel is used to deliver two confidential
messages.
5) Relay wiretap channels: A typical cooperative wireless
network considering physical layer security is consist of a
source, a destination, a relay, and an eavesdropper, each with
nt, nd, nr, and ne antennas, respectively. The relay is operated
in a decode-and-forward (DF) mode. In the first phase, the
source transmits the nt × 1 signal vector xs to the relay. The
relay, the destination, and the eavesdropper receive the signal
as [28]
yr = Hsrxs + zr, (9)
y
(1)
d = Hsdxs + zd, (10)
y(1)e = Hsexs + ze, (11)
where the nr×nt matrix Hsr, the nd×nt matrix Hsd, and the
ne×nt matrix Hse are the channel matrices from the source to
the relay, the destination, and the eavesdropper, respectively.
zr, zd, and ze are the white Gaussian noise vectors at the relay,
the destination, and the eavesdropper, respectively. The relay
decodes the received signal and forwards it to the destination.
Let the nd×nr matrix Hrd and the ne×nr matrix Hre denote
the channel matrices from the relay to the destination and the
eavesdropper, respectively. In the second phase, the nr × 1
6transmitted signal vector xr of the relay is a new version of
xs by using an encoding scheme. Then, the received signals at
the destination and the eavesdropper are, respectively, obtained
as
y
(2)
d = Hrdxr + zd, (12)
y(2)e = Hrexr + ze. (13)
The other typical cooperative channel model is the amplify-
and-forward (AF) relay channel which is also investigated
extensively in physical layer security, such as in [29], [30].
B. Concepts of Optimization
In this subsection, the concepts of optimization and opti-
mization problems are introduced for understanding the survey
easily.
1) General optimization problem: A general mathematical
optimization problem can be formulated as [31]
min
x
f(x)
s.t.

 hi(x) ≤ bi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m,gj(x) = cj , i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
(14)
where x is the set of optimization variable. The function f(x)
is the objective function. The constraint conditions hi(x) ≤ bi
and gj(x) = cj are the inequality and equality constraints,
respectively. If there is no constraint, we say the problem is
unconstrained. The optimization problem formulated in (14)
describes the problem of finding an optimal x∗ that minimizes
f(x) among all x satisfying the constraints hi(x) ≤ bi and
gj(x) = cj . Therefore, x
∗ is called the optimal solution of
the problem (14).
Convex optimization is an important class of optimization
problem. The standard convex optimization is defined as [31]
min
x
f(x)
s.t.

 hi(x) ≤ bi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m,dTj x = cj , j = 1, 2, · · · , n,
(15)
where f(x) and hi(x) are convex functions. Comparing to
problem (14), the convex problem has the characteristics that
the objective function and inequality constraint functions must
be convex while the equality constraint functions gj(x) =
dTj x− cj must be affine [31]. Convex optimization problems
can be solved optimally by many efficient algorithms, such as
interior-point methods. If a practical problem can be formu-
lated as a convex optimization problem, the original problem
can then be solved. Therefore, many problems can be solved
via convex optimization by transforming the original problem
into a convex optimization problem.
Another class of optimization problem is nonconvex op-
timization which covers the problems with nonconvex ob-
jective function or/and nonconvex constraint functions. The
nonconvex optimization problems are usually intractable. The
complexity of global optimization methods for nonconvex
problems may grow exponentially with the problem sizes.
However, some nonconvex problems can be transformed into
or approximated by convex problems. By solving the resulting
convex problems, we can get the optimal solution of the
original nonconvex problems. Moreover, to overcome the
difficulties of solving nonconvex problems, some heuristic
algorithms can be designed based on convex optimization,
such as randomized algorithms in which an approximate
solution to a nonconvex problem is found by drawing some
number of candidates from a probability distribution, and
taking the best one found as the approximate solution [31]. In
addition, for nonconvex problems, the compromise is to give
up seeking the optimal solution. Instead, we seek a locally
optimal solution by combining convex optimization with a
local optimization method, where convex optimization can be
used for initialization of local optimization.
2) Optimization in physical layer security: Following the
great progress in theories and algorithms of optimization, the
system designs in physical layer security has greatly benefited
from recent advances to the point where optimization has now
emerged as a major signal processing technique.
Towards general optimization problem (14) in physical
layer security, the objective function f(x) may be the con-
sidered performance metrics, such as secrecy rate/capacity,
secrecy outage probability/capacity, power consumption, and
secure EE which will be elaborated in Section IV. The
optimization variable x may be the resources in the designs
of secure resource allocation, beamformer/precoder in the
designs of secure beamforming/precoding, or candidates of
antennas/cooperative nodes in the designs of antenna/node
selection and cooperation. The secure resource allocation,
beamforming/precoding, and antenna/node selection and co-
operation mentioned here are the research topics in physical
layer security, which will be discussed in detail in Section III.
In physical layer security, the majority of optimization
problems are nonconvex due to the property of logarithmic
subtraction in secrecy rate/capacity. We can roughly list several
optimization problems usually appeared in this field as follows.
• Integer programming in which some or all optimization
variables are constrained to be integer values. This kind
of problems is usually raised in the designs of secure
subcarrier allocation and antenna/node selection.
• Mixed integer programming that concerns the problems
having discrete and continuous variables. In joint subcar-
rier and power allocation, or joint antenna/node selection
and beamforming, such problems are dealt with usually.
• Difference of convex functions (DC) programming where
the objective function is a subtraction of two convex
functions. This feature fits with the definition of secrecy
rate/capacity. Therefore, DC programming is widely used
for solving the problems of secrecy rate maximization.
• Quadratic programming where the objective function has
quadratic terms. This problem appears in the designs of
secure power allocation and beamforming, such as the
typical optimization problem of power minimization.
• Semidefinite programming (SDP) which optimizes a lin-
ear function of the variables subject to linear equality con-
straints and a nonnegativity constraint on the variables.
In physical layer security, some nonconvex problems are
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Secure strategies
Resource allocation
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allocation
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Signal processing
Beamforming Precoding
Antenna/node selection and cooperation
Antenna
selection
User
selection
Relay
selection
Jammer
selection
Fig. 2. Secure strategies for improving physical layer security.
usually transformed into SDP to get an efficient algorithm
that is easy to implement.
• Fractional programming which focuses on optimizing a
ratio of two nonlinear functions. The typical example
is EE maximization with the considerations of physical
layer security.
To cope with the nonconvexity of the optimization prob-
lems in physical layer security designs, many optimization
techniques have been proposed, such as dual decomposition,
alternating search, penalty function method, sequential para-
metric convex approximation (SPCA), semidefinite relaxation
(SDR), and so on, which will be discussed in Section V.
III. RESEARCH TOPICS ON SYSTEM DESIGNS OF
PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
Many conventional physical layer technologies of wire-
less communications without secrecy consideration can be
redesigned for confidential information transmission under the
framework of physical layer security. From the perspective
of system designs, the research topics on physical layer
security mainly focus on secure resource allocation, secure
beamforming/procoding, secure antenna/node selection1 and
cooperation, and the joint considerations based on the afore-
mentioned strategies, as shown in Fig. 2.
A. Secure Resource Allocation
Resource allocation which has been widely used in the
conventional communications without the consideration of
secrecy [32], is also an effective way for enhancing physical
layer security. The multidimensional wireless resources make
it possible to intentionally extend the difference between the
legitimate channel and the wiretap channel by secure resource
allocation. The multidimensional wireless resources typically
contain the frequency, timeslot, and power in orthogonal
frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) networks. In
multi-antenna and multi-node wireless networks, the wireless
resources generally refer to the spatial degrees of freedom
provided by multiple antennas and nodes, as shown in Fig.
3.
1Node selection usually adopted in multi-node scenarios includes user
selection, relay selection, and jammer selection.
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the multidimensional wireless resources in a multi-
antenna multi-node OFDMA-based wireless network.
Given the limited network resources such as bandwidth
and energy, the main challenge of secure resource allocation
is to utilize the limited resources as efficient as possible to
achieve the requirements of some performance metrics, such as
secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability, power consumption,
and secure EE. Hence, many works have focused on the
two basic problems of secure resource allocation that are the
subcarrier allocation and the power allocation in multicarrier
networks.
The subcarrier allocation aims at finding the optimal sub-
carrier usage policy that is able to effectively improve spectral
efficiency and information security. Without loss of general-
ity, the secure subcarrier allocation is usually formulated as
a binary integer programming [33]–[36]. More specifically,
whether or not a subcarrier is used for communication is
specified by a decision variable α ∈ {0, 1}, with α = 1
meaning that the subcarrier is used for transmitting and α = 0
otherwise.
Adaptive power allocation among multiple carriers and
nodes is another important method, which can be applied for
a further performance improvement [37]–[48]. Accordingly,
different strategies based on joint subcarrier and power al-
location have been proposed to achieve different design re-
quirements in physical layer security [34]–[36], [49]–[51]. The
joint subcarrier and power allocation are generally modeled
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Fig. 4. An illustration of secure beamforming and precoding in a multi-
antenna and multi-node cooperative network.
as mixed integer nonlinear optimization which is an NP-
hard problem in most situations. In practice, a number of
optimization techniques have been proposed to provide simple
and suboptimal solutions for such combinatorial optimization
problems [34], [35], [38], [49], [50].
B. Secure Beamforming and Precoding
Signal processing techniques, such as beamforming and
precoding which are popular in multi-antenna and multi-node
cooperative networks, have been demonstrated as promising
ways to achieve the physical layer security [9]. The de-
ployment of multi-antenna and multi-node cooperative net-
works is thought to have great potential to enhance not only
transmission effectiveness and reliability but also wireless
security. It has been verified that collaborative beamforming
and precoding in multi-antenna and multi-node cooperative
networks can bring some benefits in terms of the secrecy
rate, secrecy outage probability, power/energy consumption,
and secure EE.
Beamforming and precoding technologies have been ex-
ploited to achieve different performance requirements in se-
cure transmission. Secure beamforming typically refers to
one-rank transmission by which only single data stream is
transmitted over multiple antennas or nodes, whereas secure
precoding refers to multi-rank transmission by which more
than one data streams can be transmitted at the same time
[9]. Generally speaking, beamforming serves as a special
case of precoding. An illustration of secure beamforming
and precoding in multi-antenna and multi-node cooperative
networks is shown in Fig. 4, where the source precoding is
assisted by artificial noise (AN) and the intermediate nodes
are used for relay precoding and jammer beamforming.
The main idea of secure beaforming is to compute the
optimal beamforming vector for achieving some performance
metrics of physical layer security by enhancing the signal qual-
ity at the destination node and decreasing the signal quality at
the eavesdropper. Most of the secure beamforming involves
solving optimization problems. Due to the special form of
logarithmic subtraction in the secrecy rate, the optimization
problems of secure beamforming are usually neither convex
nor concave in many situations. Therefore, they can only be
solved by numerical methods with high complexity, such as
in [29], [52]–[56]. To mitigate the computational cost, some
low-complexity suboptimal algorithms have been proposed to
simplify the beamforming designs [57], [58].
Noteworthily, several existing beamforming techniques
which are simple but not optimal have been also adopted
widely in different scenarios of secure communications,
such as null-space beamforming (also named zero-forcing
beamforming) [57]–[61] and maximum ratio transmission
(MRT) beamforming [58], [62]–[64]. Null-space beamforming
chooses the beamforming vector lying in the null space of
the eavesdropper’s channel vector. Then, the eavesdropper gets
nothing in the transmission process, such that the information
leakage is avoided. In optimization designs, nulling signal at
the eavesdropper can be expressed as a constraint, i.e.,
hew
H = 0, (16)
where he and w denote the eavesdropper’s channel vector
and the null-space beamforming vector, respectively. MRT
is another attractive beamforming scheme because of its low
computational complexity. MRT combined with maximal ratio
combining (MRC) can maximize the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) at the receiver and achieve a performance close to
channel capacity in low-SNR scenarios [65]. In particular,
the transmitter calculates its MRT beamforming vector, which
only requires the knowledge of the channel from itself to the
receiver. MRT beamforming can be expressed as
w =
hH
‖h‖ , (17)
where w and h denote the MRT beamforming vector and the
legitimate channel vector from the transmitter to the intended
receiver, respectively.
Precoding is another important technology to achieve differ-
ent design objectives in physical layer security, which is espe-
cially appropriate for multi-stream data transmission or multi-
user access. When the intended transceivers are equipped
with multiple antennas, the confidential messages of one or
multiple users can be spatially multiplexed onto multiple
independent subchannels via precoding. By optimizing the
precoder, the interested performance metrics of physical layer
security can be achieved while the quality of service (QoS) can
be guaranteed simultaneously [66]–[71]. The secret dirty-paper
coding (S-DPC) has been proposed to achieve the maximum
secrecy rate in [72], [73]. However, the complexity of S-DPC
is computationally prohibitive, so that it is difficult to apply
this precoding scheme in practice. The complexity of a pre-
coding scheme may be crucial, which affects the application of
precoding schemes in practice. In literature, due to the high
complexity of the optimal precoding in some scenarios, as
alternatives the suboptimal schemes have been developed to
reduce computational complexity and facilitate their practical
application [66], [67], [69], [70]. As a matter of fact, the linear
precoding techniques are also attractive alternatives because
of their simplicity [66], [74]. As more simple linear precoding
techniques, generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)
[26], [28], [74]–[77] and regularized channel inversion (RCI)
[78]–[82] have been extensively adopted in physical-layer
secure transmission. The GSVD is to simultaneously diago-
nalize the legitimate channels and the wiretap channels, such
9that a set of parallel independent subchannels is created to
transmit the messages of different users [74], [83]. Channel
inversion (CI) precoding, sometimes known as zero-forcing
(ZF) precoding, is a popular and practical linear precoding
scheme which can control inter-user interference by canceling
all signals leaked to the unintended users. RCI based on CI
has better performance than plain CI by using a regularization
parameter. RCI can achieve a tradeoff among signal power,
interference, and information leakage [78].
Using AN to deteriorate the quality of the received signals
at eavesdroppers is also a good way in physical layer security,
which is herein referred to as noise-assisted secure strategies.
In such strategies, the transmitted signal is superimposed with
AN [30], [42], [45], [62], [83]–[92]. This strategy is also
termed as “masked beamforming” in the multi-input single-
output multi-eavesdropper (MISOME) wiretap channel [75],
“masked precoding” in the multi-input multi-output multi-
eavesdropper (MIMOME) wiretap channel in [76], and “AN
precoding” in [42]. In order to avoid interfering destination
node, the simple but not optimal method is to let the AN lie
in the null space of the signal space, i.e., satisfying
hz = 0, (18)
where h and z denote legitimate channel vector and AN vector,
respectively [42], [87]–[89]. Furthermore, the AN can also be
optimized globally to achieve the optimal secure performance
[30], [62], [83].
C. Antenna/Node Selection and Cooperation
In multi-antenna and multi-node wireless networks, antenna
and node selection have been exploited to strengthen trans-
mission reliability, which also have great potential to enhance
wireless security [22]. It has been verified that selecting
the proper antennas or nodes from the candidate set is a
simple but effective way to improve the performance of secure
transmission while saving resource. As a result, antenna/node
selection and cooperation have been considered and widely
investigated in many works.
MIMO technologies are believed to be one of the foremost
technologies pertaining to physical layer security. In a MIMO
system, transmit antenna selection provides solutions to reduce
the hardware complexity resulted from large antenna arrays
and radio frequency chains, insertion losses attributed to
radio frequency switches, and feedback overhead needed for
transceiver communication [93]. In physical layer security,
transmit antenna selection as a usual approach to exploit
spatial degrees of freedom in multi-antenna scenarios, has been
comprehensively investigated for maximizing the secrecy rate
[93], improving the SNR of the legitimate channels [94], [95],
and enhancing security from the viewpoint of secrecy outage
performance [96]–[100].
In multi-user networks, the randomness of users’ geograph-
ical locations leading to random signal attenuation indepen-
dently across users, can also be used to enhance secure
performance [101]. Accordingly, user selection/scheduling as
a promising paradigm can be adopted to utilize the spatial
diversity in multi-user networks [22], [102]. In a multi-user
network, user selection determines which users should be
scheduled for confidential data transmission. Typically, the
user with the best channel quality is selected to improve
secrecy rate or throughput [103]–[105]. This optimal selection
scheme depends on both the legitimate and wiretap channels.
Some suboptimal user selection schemes with considering
wiretap links are also used due to their low complexity or
the unavailability of wiretap CSI [22], [103], [104], [106].
In addition, user selection/scheduling can also be used for
saving power with secrecy rate constraints or enabling the
largest possible user set with an effective transmission power
constraint [107]. In some situations, the legitimate channels
to users may experience severe propagation loss and deep
fading, and such users may have little chance to be scheduled.
Therefore, the fairness of user selection/scheduling needs to
be considered. Two competing problems should be balanced
herein: achieving the optimal secure QoS while ensuring each
user with certain opportunities to access networks [22], [108].
In multi-relay cooperative networks, the distributed relay
nodes may provide spatial degrees of freedom which can be
exploited to improve secure QoS against the eavesdropping
attack. It is well-known that cooperative relaying with relay
selection can bring some benefits in terms of rate, EE, and
security. More specifically, cooperative relaying combined
with relay selection has the potential of maximizing the se-
crecy capacity [109], maximizing the Shannon capacity to the
destination node as well as minimizing that to the eavesdropper
[109], [110], reducing the secrecy outage probability [111],
[112], maximizing the SNR ratio of the destination node to
the eavesdropper [110], [113], or saving the limited power
of network nodes [64], [114], [115]. Generally speaking, to
strengthen the network security against the eavesdropping at-
tack, three relay selection schemes have been proposed, which
are referred to as minimum selection considering only the
relay-eavesdropper links, conventional selection considering
only the relay-destination links, and the optimal selection
taking the both links into account [110], [113]. In literature,
some heuristic algorithms have also been proposed for the
optimal relay selection with different purposes.
Relay nodes can be used for not only cooperative relaying
but also cooperative jamming [10], [11], [116]. Cooperative
jamming with jammer selection also has the ability to enhance
secrecy of wireless networks. This security-enhanced strategy
selects the jammers from trusted or untrusted intermediate
nodes to confuse eavesdroppers by transmitting artificial in-
terference signals [117]–[120]. With regard to the untrusted
nodes which may be potential eavesdroppers, we should use
them discreetly. However, it has been verified in [121] that,
seeking for cooperation with the untrusted relay nodes can
achieve a higher secrecy rate than just treating them as pure
eavesdroppers. In other words, the untrusted relays can also be
used for cooperative relaying while protecting the confidential
data from them [29], [52], [122]–[129]. Therefore, no matter
whether the relays are trusted or not, they can be used
intelligently for cooperative relaying or jamming [129], [130].
Moreover, cooperative jamming with the destination node can
also provide secrecy improvements, such as in [40], [127],
[131].
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Fig. 5. An illustration of joint relay and jammer selection and cooperation.
In practice, the joint relay and jammer selection is more
effective for improving the secure performance of the whole
network than using any single approach. As illustrated in Fig.
5, by using such a joint method, some proper intermediate
nodes are selected to operate at a conventional relaying mode
for assisting the confidential data transmission between the
source node and the destination node. Meanwhile, another set
of intermediate nodes are selected as jammers to confuse the
potential eavesdropper [132]–[138].
D. Joint Strategies of Several Approaches
The secrecy improvements in physical layer can be sup-
ported by secure resource allocation, signal processing, and
antenna/node selection and cooperation. Secure resource allo-
cation mainly focuses on resource usage policies by fully using
the multidimensional wireless resources involving frequency,
timeslot and power. Secure beamforming and precoding be-
longing to signal processing are to design beamformer and
precoder to well exploit the characteristics of multi-antenna
and multi-node settings which may form MIMO or virtual
MIMO networks. Antenna/node selection and cooperation aim
at selecting the proper antennas or nodes from the candidate set
to improve the performance of secure transmission. All of the
foregoing strategies can be carried out to strengthen informa-
tion security while achieving the requirements of performance
metrics and resource savings. In other words, based on the
ideas of these fundamental security strategies, we can design
some different transmission schemes to achieve the specific
requirements of network performance subject to secrecy and
resource constraints.
In order to achieve better performance of physical layer
security, any single approach mentioned above might not be
sufficient. Therefore, the joint strategies based on some of the
above approaches may be preferable in practical applications.
As in [36], [139], and [140], joint resource allocation and user
scheduling have been proposed to enhance physical layer se-
curity in OFDMA networks. Antenna selection combined with
beamforming/precoding has been demonstrated to be effective
in secure MIMO system designs [93], [95], [141]. Distributed
beamforming with relay/jammer selection has been exploited
in cooperative networks [142]–[144]. Additionally, other joint
strategies have also been addressed for some specific sce-
narios to obtain secrecy improvements, such as cooperative
beamforming and user selection in [106], [145], jamming-
aided beamforming/precoding in [63], [84], [85], [91], [146]–
[148], joint power allocation and beamforming/precoding in
[77], [149]–[151], etc.
IV. PERFORMANCE METRICS AND BASIC OPTIMIZATION
PROBLEMS IN PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
For the secure transmission designs, the choice of perfor-
mance metrics is remarkably critical. In physical layer security
designs, there are several problems usually being raised from
different performance requirements:
1) The transmission effectiveness of secure transmission
strategies, that is evaluated by the achievable secrecy
rate/capacity.
2) The reliability of secure transmission strategies, which is
measured by secrecy outage probability/capacity.
3) The power cost of secure transmission strategies, that is
the minimum power consumption needed for ensuring the
secure QoS.
4) The EE of secure transmission strategies, which focuses
on the amount of secret bits transferred with unit energy
or the energy consumption required for sending one secret
bit.
To investigate these problems listed above, the correspond-
ing metrics termed as secrecy rate/capacity, secrecy outage
probability/capacity, power consumption, and secure EE, are
usually adopted in system designs to evaluate the achievable
performance of the proposed secure transmission strategies.
More specifically, these performance metrics are usually taken
as the optimization objectives for system designs in different
application scenarios.
A. Secrecy Rate/Capacity
Being similar to the data rate in conventional communica-
tions, the secrecy rate is a fundamental metric to assess the
transmission effectiveness of physical-layer secure strategies.
In physical layer security, the secrecy rate is defined as the
secret bits transmitted on the given channel per second, which
heavily depends on channel inputs. To evaluate the secrecy
more conveniently and computation affordably, the Gaussian
inputs as well as the achievable secrecy rate are usually
adopted in many works [12]. The achievable secrecy rate can
be described as the difference between the achievable data
rate of the legitimate channel and the wiretap channel with
the Gaussian codebook, which is expressed as
Rs = [Rm −Re]+ , (19)
where [x]+ , max{0, x}. Rm denotes the data rate of the
legitimate channel from the source node to the destination
node. Re denotes the data rate of the wiretap channel from
the source node to the eavesdropper. Clearly, the achievable
secrecy rate is a lower bound of the secrecy capacity [12]. In
practical designs, by some approaches as secure beamforming
or resource allocation, a non-zero secrecy rate can be obtained
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since the wiretap channel is intentionally degraded while
improving the quality of legitimate channel.
Another metric closely related to secrecy rate is secrecy
capacity, which is defined as the upper bound of the secrecy
rate [3] [152]. More specifically, the secrecy capacity is the
maximum secrecy rate by which the confidential messages of
the source node can be securely and reliably transmitted to
the destination node whereas the unauthenticated users cannot
obtain any useful information in this process. In Wyner’s
pioneering work [5], the secrecy capacity of a degraded
wiretap channel has been given by
Cs = sup
p(X)
{I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)}, (20)
where X denotes the channel inputs at source node. Y and
Z denote the channel outputs at the destination node and
eavesdropper, respectively. I(·; ·) represents the mutual infor-
mation. The secrecy capacity shown in (20) can be achieved
by choosing the optimal input probability distribution p(X).
For any distribution p(X), the corresponding X , Y , and Z
form a Markov chain [3] [152].
Based on Wyner’s results, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner investigated
a more general (non-degraded) wiretap channel and derived
its secrecy capacity as [6]
Cs = sup
p(V,X)
{I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)}, (21)
where V is an auxiliary input variable. By introducing appro-
priate random variable V , the maximization in (21) can be
implemented over all joint probability distributions p(V,X)
while forming a Markov chain V → X → (Y, Z). As to
the familiar Gaussian channel, the secrecy capacity has been
derived in [7] as following:
Cs = Cm − Ce, (22)
where Cm and Ce denote the Shannon capacities of the
legitimate and wiretap channels, respectively.
The aforementioned secrecy rate and secrecy capacity have
been investigated without considering the fading of wireless
channels. However, fading of wireless channels is an inevitable
issue in many situations, as stated in [152] in which three
standard fading models as well as the corresponding ergodic
secrecy rate/capacity have been well discussed, including the
ergodic-fading model, block-fading model, and quasi-static
fading model. When the channel fading is taken into consid-
eration, the average capability of secure communication over
fading channels should be evaluated, and the ergodic secrecy
rate or secrecy capacity is then a quite suitable metric for this
case [12], [153]. In practice, since achieving ergodic secrecy
capacity may be computationally difficult in many situations,
the achievable ergodic secrecy rate is therefore adopted to
measure the secrecy performance in fading scenarios. The
achievable ergodic secrecy rate is defined as the difference
between the ergodic rates of the legitimate and wiretap chan-
nels with Gaussian codebooks, which is more computationally
efficient in many cases. As the lower bound of ergodic secrecy
capacity, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate has usually been
taken as the optimization objective in secure transmission
designs with the consideration of channel fading [12].
Towards secure communication system designs, the primary
concern is how much the secrecy rate can be achieved for
delivering the confidential data securely and reliably. This
problem can be modeled as maximization of the achievable
secrecy rate, that is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate
as much as possible by using some physical-layer technologies
such as resource allocation, beamforming/precoding, coopera-
tive diversity, or other optimization algorithms. To maximize
the achievable secrecy rate, the most important factor is the
power limitation in addition to the bandwidth. Accordingly,
one common formulation of achievable secrecy rate maximiza-
tion on the given channels generally aims at maximizing the
secrecy rate under the constraints of the maximum allowed
power. For instance, the achievable secrecy rate maximization
in a relay network can be modeled as
max
P
(S)
t ,P
(j)
t ,j∈Ω
Rs
(
P
(S)
t , P
(j)
t
)
s.t. P
(S)
t +
∑
j∈Ω
P
(j)
t ≤ P summax ,
or

 0 ≤ P
(S)
t ≤ P (S)max,
0 ≤ P (j)t ≤ P (j)max, j ∈ Ω,
(23)
where Pmaxsum denotes the maximum sum transmission power
of all nodes in the relay network, and P
(S)
max and P
(j)
max denote
the maximum transmission power of the source and the jth
relay nodes, respectively. In existing literature, there are two
kinds of power constraints in the problem of secrecy rate
maximization. One is the sum power constraints of all nodes
specified by the constraint P
(S)
t +
∑
j∈Ω
P
(j)
t ≤ P summax in (23),
and the other is the individual power constraint of each node
specified by the constraints 0 ≤ P (S)t ≤ P (S)max and 0 ≤ P (j)t ≤
P
(j)
max, j ∈ Ω in (23). Noteworthily, beamforming may be more
effective for maximizing secrecy rate by strengthening signals
on a desired direction and suppressing/eliminating signals
on undesired directions. When beamforming is considered
in such a relay network, the weight vector of all relays
will be introduced to replace power, as investigated in [59]
and [154]. The maximization of the achievable secrecy rate
has been comprehensively investigated in many scenarios, for
example multicarrier systems, multi-antenna systems, multi-
node cooperative systems, etc.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability/Capacity
Due to the channel fading and imperfect CSI, secure trans-
mission may be broken. Therefore, it is of particular interest to
explore the secrecy outage behaviour of a secure transmission
strategy [153], [155]. Then, the secrecy outage probability is
an appropriate metric to characterize the probability that secure
transmission cannot be achieved. Precisely, the secrecy outage
probability is defined as the probability that a secrecy outage
event happens.
There are two different definitions of secrecy outage events.
The more popular one is that the secrecy outage happens
when the instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs drops below a
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target secrecy rate R0s , i.e., {Cs < R0s} [40], [155]–[159]. In
other words, the target secrecy rate is too high to be supported
by the current channel state, and the information security is
compromised. The secrecy outage probability of this definition
is given by
pout
(
R0s
)
= Pr
{
Cs < R
0
s
}
. (24)
In (24), the outage events {Cs < R0s} happen whenever
the intended receiver does not receive the secret messages
reliably (i.e., the message cannot be decoded correctly by
intended receivers) or the message transmission is not perfectly
secure (i.e., some information may leak to eavesdroppers)
[160], [161]. However, this definition does not distinguish
between reliability and security. As a result, an outage based
on this definition does not necessarily imply a failure in
achieving perfect secrecy. To be specific, the outage events
{Cm < R0s} mean that the secrecy rate cannot be supported
by the legitimate channels and the secure transmission would
be certainly suspended. Clearly, these suspension events fall
within the outage events
{
Cs < R
0
s
}
due to Cm < R
0
s
implying Cs < R
0
s , but it is clearly not a failure in achieving
perfect secrecy [161]. Then, the outage probability in secure
transmissions can be more explicitly expressed as [33]
pout
(
R0m, R
0
s
)
= 1− Pr{Cm ≥ R0m, Cs ≥ R0s} , (25)
where R0m is the target coding rate of the confidential mes-
sage, R0s ≤ R0m. The outage events {Cm < R0m} imply
the legitimate channels cannot support the coding rate R0m.
Consequently, at a target secrecy rate R0s and a target coding
rate R0m, the reliable and secure transmission can only be
ensured at a probability 1− pout
(
R0m, R
0
s
)
.
The other definition of secrecy outage is proposed in [161],
which directly measures the probability that a transmitted
message fails to achieve perfect secrecy. In [161], consid-
ering the Wyner’s encoding scheme [5], the rate difference
Re , Rm − Rs is defined to reflect the cost of securing
message transmission against eavesdropping, where Rm and
Rs, respectively, denote two rates chosen by secure encoder,
namely, the rate of the transmitted codewords and the rate
of the confidential information. The transmitted messages
can be decoded correctly if Rm < Cm, whereas it fails to
achieve perfect secrecy if Re < Ce. Hence, the secrecy outage
probability is defined in [161] as
pout (Ce)=Pr {Rm−Rs<Ce|message transmission} , (26)
which is a probability conditioned upon a message actually
being transmitted. If the source transmitter has no knowledge
about the instantaneous CSI of the legitimate channel, the
transmission may always occur, so that the secrecy out-
age probability in (26) then reduces to the unconditional
probability Pr {Rm −Rs < Ce}. More generally, when the
instantaneous CSI of legitimate channel is available, the source
transmitter can decide whether or not to transmit with possibly
variable rates according to channel conditions. Therefore, it is
possible to reduce the secrecy outage probability by carefully
designing the rate of the transmitted codewords Rm, the rate
of the confidential information Rs, and the condition for
transmission [161].
Another important concept related to the secrecy outage
probability is the secrecy outage capacity Cout(ǫ), which is
defined as the largest secrecy rate that can be supported under
a tolerable secrecy outage probability ǫ [12] [157] [162] [163].
In other words, the secrecy outage capacity is the maximum
achievable secrecy rate such that the secrecy outage probability
is less than ǫ, i.e.,
pout (Cout(ǫ)) = Pr {Cs < Cout(ǫ)} = ǫ. (27)
The practical significance of secrecy outage probabil-
ity/capacity is that these definitions provide outage formu-
lations which give a more explicit measure of the security
level. From the system design perspective, it is meaningful
to evaluate the secrecy outage behaviour of the proposed
transmission scheme [161].
For the optimization design in physical layer security, the
reliability of secure transmission which is generally measured
by secrecy outage probability has also attracted increasing
concerns. Ideally, the secure communication should be im-
plemented without outage. Motivated by this observation, we
expect to reduce the secrecy outage probability with the best
effort. This raises the optimization problem of secrecy outage
probability minimization subject to resource constraints. Tak-
ing the relay network as an example, the minimization of the
secrecy outage probability can be roughly formulated as
min
P
(S)
t ,P
(j)
t ,j∈Ω
pout
(
R0s
)
s.t.

 0 ≤ P
(S)
t ≤ P (S)max,
0 ≤ P (j)t ≤ P (j)max, j ∈ Ω.
(28)
In (28), the peak power of each transmission node is taken
into account to limit the excessive high power consumption
resulted from the improvement of the secrecy rate in mini-
mizing secrecy outage probability.
C. Power/Energy Consumption
Power/energy consumption is a key consideration in
resource-limited scenarios such as battery-dependent net-
works. In general, the sustainability of secure communications
in such networks is the most important concern. Therefore,
to reduce energy consumption and prolong network lifetime,
power/energy cost is one primary metric considered in physical
layer security designs.
Before designing a secure transmission scheme with limited
power and energy, we first analyse the factors of power
consumption in wireless networks [163]. According to [164],
the total power consumption along the signal path can be
divided into two main components: the power consumption
of all the power amplifiers Pa and the power consumption
of all other circuit blocks Pc. The power consumption of
all power amplifiers heavily depends on the output power of
power amplifiers Pt, i.e.,
Pa = Pt/η, (29)
where η is the efficiency of power amplifier. The other circuit
blocks include the basic circuits at the transmitter and receiver
13
excluding power amplifiers, such as active filter, frequency
synthesizer, mixer, intermediate frequency amplifier, analog-
to-digital or digital-to-analog converter, and so on [163], [164].
Accordingly, the power consumption of all other circuit blocks
Pc can be roughly expressed as [164], [165]
Pc = NtPct +NrPcr + Pc0, (30)
where Nt and Nr denote the numbers of transmitter antennas
and receiver antennas, respectively. Pct and Pcr denote the
power consumed by the basic circuits at each transmit and
receive chain, respectively. Pc0 denotes the power consumed
by baseband circuits such as digital signal processing circuits.
It can be seen that Pct, Pcr, and Pc0 are independent of the
secrecy rate. As a result, the total power consumption of a
system can be given by
P = Pa + Pc
= Pt/η +NtPct +NrPcr + Pc0.
(31)
The power consumption of a wireless communication sys-
tem can be usually formulated as (31). However, in a practical
scenario, there may be some variations in the power consump-
tion model. For example, in a cooperative relay network, the
power consumption model can be expressed as
P =
1
2η

P (S)t +∑
j∈Ω
P
(j)
t

+ P (S)c +∑
j∈Ω
P (j)c , (32)
where, Ω is the set composed of relay nodes and j denotes the
jth relay node. P
(S)
t and P
(j)
t denote the transmission power
of the source node and the jth relay node, respectively. P
(S)
c
and P
(j)
c , respectively, denote the power of the basic circuit
blocks at the source node and the jth relay node, which can
be obtained by (30). The factor 12 lies in the fact that the
transmission is completed in two stages due to half duplex.
The resource-limited regime motivates us to develop the
power-efficient transmission strategies which aim at minimiz-
ing power consumption [114], [166], [167]. For this purpose,
the power level of transmitters should be adjusted to save trans-
mission power while satisfying the target QoS requirements.
It is worth noting that, although relay cooperation has the
potential of transmission effectiveness, reliability, and security,
relay nodes may consume additional power, such as the basic
circuit power which is inherent in relay cooperation and
unrelated with secrecy rate. Therefore, from the viewpoint of
transmission designs, the power adaptation and relay selection
should be performed jointly to achieve the requirements of
power-efficient secure transmission.
It is noteworthy that a higher transmission rate of messages
can be achieved if no secrecy constraint is imposed. When
secrecy is considered, the transmission rate of confidential
messages will decrease due to secure coding. Hence, higher
power consumption is needed to ensure a higher level of
secrecy at the physical layer [168].
For secure transmission designs in power-limited scenar-
ios, such as the transmission nodes powered by batteries
or energy harvesting devices [169], we should give priority
to saving power and prolonging communication durations.
These observations motivate us to design secure transmission
schemes focusing on the minimization problem of power
cost. In general, power minimization means consuming the
minimum power to achieve the fundamental demand of secure
transmission such as the minimum target secrecy rate [53],
[59], [114], [154], the required SNR threshold of destination
node [91], [170], the given probability of secrecy [86], or other
performance requirements. For example, in a relay network,
the basic formulation of power minimization can be expressed
as
min
P
(S)
t ,P
(j)
t ,j∈Ω
P = 12η
(
P
(S)
t +
∑
j∈Ω
P
(j)
t
)
+P
(S)
c +
∑
j∈Ω
P
(j)
c
s.t. Rs ≥ R0s.
(33)
The formulation in (33) is only a rough model, which can
be specified in practical applications. For instance, when the
beamforming is performed for minimizing the power con-
sumption, the total power is then determined by the weights
of beamformer [59], [154], [171].
D. Secure EE
In the conventional communications without secrecy con-
straints, the utilized efficiency of system energy referred to
as EE is an important metric for green transmission strategy
designs. When the security threats and energy limitations are
considered jointly in wireless networks, it is significant to
design energy-efficient secure transmission strategies which
should operate in a confidential and green manner. Therefore,
from the perspective of green physical layer security, an ap-
propriate metric for assessing the utilized efficiency of system
energy is also of primary importance. In general, the utilized
efficiency of system energy can be measured by different met-
rics from different viewpoints, such as the viewpoints from the
component level, equipment level, and system/network level.
Towards the EE of system/network level, it aims at measuring
both the energy consumed by all communication nodes and the
performance experienced at the network level (i.e., capacity,
security, coverage, etc.). The EE of system/network level is
popular in transmission strategy designs.
There are two main metrics which have been defined for
evaluating the EE of novel techniques towards physical layer
security. One metric is the secure EE [64], [115], [172],
which is defined as the amount of secret bits transmitted with
unit energy consumption. Designing energy-efficient secure
transmission strategies with this metric, it is expected to
maximize the secure EE. The resulting effect is that as much
confidential information as possible is transmitted with a given
amount of energy. Hence, given the amount of energy ∆E
consumed in a duration ∆T , the secure EE can be defined as
EB =
Rs∆T
∆E
=
Rs
P
(bits/Joule) . (34)
The metric of secure EE is in fact the ratio of secrecy rate
to total power consumption, which has been frequently used
in literature for investigating the EE of physical-layer secure
communications [64], [71], [115], [172], [173]. This metric
is also termed as “secret bits per Joule”, since its unit is
bits/Joule.
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Another metric proposed to assess the EE of physical-layer
secure transmissions is the energy per secret bit, which is
suitable for evaluating the minimum energy required to send
one secret bit (i.e., minimum bit energy required for reliable
communications under secrecy constraints). The precise for-
mula of this metric is the ratio of total power consumption to
secrecy rate [174] [175], i.e.,
EJ =
P
Rs
(Joules/bit) . (35)
Noteworthily, these two metrics of secure EE are reciprocal
to each other. The resulting optimization problem by using one
metric is in general the dual problem of that by using the other
metric. Which metric is better in practice should fully consider
the practical scenarios, for reducing the difficulties of secure
transmission designs. As stated in [176], the metric of secret
bits per Joule is more popular since it is convenient to capture
the degree of proportionality between the energy consumption
and different levels of load. This metric can reflect dynamic
network conditions considering energy consumption and se-
crecy constraints in different situations of load. However, the
metric of energy per secret bit is suitable to assess the network
EE only at a nonzero secrecy rate.
In addition, it is obvious that the metrics of secure EE
are closely related to the model of the power consumption.
The traditional energy-efficient technologies only consider the
transmission power, but which is not the only part of power
consumption in a networks. A holistic and system-wide power
model is imperative [177]. Therefore, the secure EE should be
formulated with all power consumption including transmission
power, basic circuit power, and signaling overhead in the entire
network [177].
In physical layer security, more power and energy, compared
with the conventional communication without secrecy require-
ment, may be consumed to protect confidential information
against eavesdropping. This observation can be verified by the
secrecy rate function shown in (19) where the information rate
leaking to the eavesdropper generates extra consumption of
power and energy. This fact may increase the burden of power
and energy supplies, in particular in the scenarios with limited
power and energy. When the limited power and energy become
the main factors for securing communications, the first con-
cern, impelled by the requirements of “green communication”,
is to deliver confidential information with high secure EE as
much as possible. This motivation raises the maximization of
the secure EE in physical layer security. Also taking the relay
network as an instance, the mathematical formulation of secure
EE maximization can be roughly modeled as
max
P
(S)
t ,P
(j)
t ,j∈Ω
{
EB =
Rs
P
}
s.t.


0 ≤ P (S)t ≤ P (S)max,
0 ≤ P (j)t ≤ P (j)max, j ∈ Ω,
Rs ≥ R0s.
(36)
It is worth noting that the secure EE maximization should
ensure the secure QoS requirement which is specified by
the constraint Rs ≥ R0s in (36). Here, R0s is used to avoid
achieving high secure EE but with too low secrecy rate. In
some literature [51], [178], R0s can be adjusted to balance the
system performance between secure EE and secrecy rate.
It is pointed out that the aforementioned metrics and op-
timization problems are all based on information-theoretic
security, since those metrics and problems are intertwined with
the secrecy rate/capacity which is based on information theory.
According to [179], another type of performance metrics for
secrecy is based on practical measures where the secrecy
level is quantified by the metrics that can be observed in
practical communication scenarios, such as secrecy gap which
is usually characterized by bit error rate or packet error rate
versus SNR. To be specific, secrecy gap reflects the minimum
required difference between the SNR of legitimate receiver
and eavesdropper for which secure communication is possible
[179], [180]. This metric has also been used to make a
quantitative measure for system designs, for instance in [180]–
[182].
V. THE STATE OF THE ART OF OPTIMIZATION AND DESIGN
IN PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
In the previous section, we discussed the performance met-
rics and fundamental optimization problems in physical layer
security. Each research topic of physical-layer security designs
investigated in Section III involves extending these funda-
mental optimization problems to practical scenarios according
to specific application conditions and solving the resulting
optimization problems to achieve the required performance
metrics. In this section, the state of the art of optimization
and design in physical layer security will be summarized
from the perspectives of the aforementioned research topics
in physical-layer security designs. Each research topic will be
presented from four categories of fundamental optimization
problems including maximization of achievable secrecy rate,
minimization of secrecy outrage probability, minimization of
power consumption, and maximization of secure EE.
A. Secure Resource Allocation
As a promising way for improving the performance require-
ments of physical layer security, secure resource allocation
has been extensively investigated for different purposes. As
discussed above, the designs of secure resource allocation
are usually performed by solving four optimization problems
which are related with the corresponding performance metrics.
1) Maximization of achievable secrecy rate: Many works
focus on designing secure resource allocation strategies to
improve achievable secrecy rate. A conventional approach
towards maximizing secrecy rate in multicarrier systems is
to globally allocate the limited power and subcarriers for all
transmission nodes. This goal usually leads to a mixed integral
programming in many scenarios, which has been investigated
in many works [34], [35], [38], [49], [50], [183]. Such as
in [34], the resource allocation for a secure multicarrier AF
relay communication system is investigated, in which decision
variables µsi ∈ {0, 1} and µri ∈ {0, 1} are defined for the
source and the relay, respectively, for specifying the state of
communication on a carrier i. More specifically, if µsi = 1
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and µri = 1 then both the source and the relay transmit in
respective slots, while if µsi = 1 and µri = 0 then only
the source transmits in its slot and it remains silent with the
relay in the second slot. The case µsi = 0 and µri = 0
indicates no communication in both the slots and the case
µsi = 0 and µri = 1 has no significance. Then, the resource
allocation strategy for maximizing secrecy capacity in such a
relay-aided multicarrier system can be derived by solving the
typical mixed integral programming
max
Psi,Pri,µsi,µri
∑
i
Ci (Psi, Pri, µsi, µri)
s.t.


∑
i
µsi (Psi + µriPri) ≤ Pmaxsum
Psi ≥ 0, Pri ≥ 0
µsi ∈ {0, 1}, µri ∈ {0, 1},
(37)
where Psi, Pri, and Ci denote the source power, the relay
power, and the secrecy capacity on carrier i, respectively.
Other specific formulations towards different scenarios have
also been explored in this areas. In [35], a secure resource
allocation policy is addressed for a downlink OFDMA-based
network with the coexistence of secure users and normal
users which have no confidential messages and do not care
about security issues. In [38], the transmission modes re-
ferred to as no communication, direct communication, and
relay communication are determined adaptively by subcarrier
allocation while the optimal source and relay power allocation
policy over all subcarriers is addressed to maximize the sum
secrecy rate under a total power constraint. Jamming and AN-
aided resource allocation for sum secrecy rate maximization
is, respectively, studied in [49] and [183], where the former
focuses on the OFDMA-based two-way relay wireless sensor
networks while the latter focuses on the OFDMA systems with
joint secrecy information and power transfer. For considering
the fairness of resource allocation in secure multiuser OFDMA
downlink works, the work presented in [50] aims to assign
subchannels and allocate power to optimize the max-min
fairness criterion over the users’ secrecy rate. Besides, robust
secure resource allocation in relay-assisted cognitive radio
networks is investigated in [184] considering the uncertainty
of CSI.
To solve the problems of secure resource allocation men-
tioned above, the approach of dual decomposition is usually
adopted in many foregoing works. The basic idea of dual
decomposition can be summarized as: 1) constructing a La-
grangian dual problem associated with the original problem
by transforming the constraints into the objective function
in the form of a weighted sum, and 2) decomposing the
Lagrangian dual problem into distributed subproblems which
are then coordinated with a high-level master problem by
iterative alternating optimization between the two levels [185],
as illustrated in Fig. 6. Based on dual decomposition, the
resource allocation in some secure scenarios can be solved
by different distributed algorithms which are efficient for
computing in many cases.
2) Minimization of secrecy outage probability: Secure re-
source allocation is also an effective approach for minimiz-
Original problem
Dual problem
Lagrangian function
Master problem
Decomposition
Subproblem 1 Subproblem N…
Finding the optimal
values of original
optimization variables
Updating the dual variables
Information passing
between the two layers
Fig. 6. Dual decomposition approach for secure resource allocation.
ing secrecy outage probability. Considering a typical secure
OFDMA downlink system in [33], the outage-optimal subcar-
rier allocation is addressed to minimize the secrecy outage
probability pmout of each user m while guaranteeing that each
user has the identical probability to access each subcarrier n.
The formulation of the problem is summarized as
min {pmout}∀m
s.t.


∑
∀m
µmn ≤ 1∑
∀n
µmn ≤ 1
µmn ∈ {0, 1},
(38)
where µmn are the decision variables with µmn = 1 meaning
that subcarrier n is assigned to user m. Otherwise, µmn = 0.
The constraints
∑
∀m
µmn ≤ 1 and
∑
∀n
µmn ≤ 1 imply that
each subcarrier can only be assigned to no more than one
user with identical probability. It is noted that, to deal with
the difficulty of such a probabilistic integral programming, a
random bipartite graph approach is proposed with a logarithm-
polynomial complexity when applying parallel implementa-
tions. A more complicated formulation of probabilistic mixed
integral programming is investigated in [186] to minimize the
secrecy outage probability of a wireless systems with adaptive
transmission rates and secrecy rates, in which a stochastic
network optimization framework is introduced to overcome
the difficulty of such a problem.
The outage-optimal power allocation is also explored exten-
sively. By deriving explicit expressions of the secrecy outage
probability, the closed-form solutions of the optimal power al-
location are obtained to achieve high outage performance in an
AF relay network with destination-assisted jamming [40], an
AN-aided secure multi-antenna transmission coexisting with
randomly distributed eavesdroppers [45] [187], and a MISO
system with a multi-antenna eavesdropper [90], respectively.
The minimization of the secrecy outage probability is also
raised in the scenarios of secure wireless information and
power transfer in [188]–[190]. In [188], the transmission
power allocation and power splitting ratio for AN signal are
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TABLE IV
THE COMPARISON OF POWER-EFFICIENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
Scenarios Wireless resources Assumptions of CSI Secure QoS constraints Solutions
MISO networks with
AN [86]
The total power for
secrecy information
and AN
Perfect CSI of legitimate chan-
nel and unknown CSI of eaves-
dropper
Received SNR at des-
tination and a given
probability of secrecy
A closed-form solution
Multiuser MISO net-
works with jamming
[192]
The total power for
secrecy information
and jamming signals
Perfect CSI of all channels Target secrecy rate Numerical analyses based on a line
search method
A non-orthogonal mul-
tiple access system with
multiple users [193]
Decoding order,
transmission rates,
and power
Instantaneous channel gains of
all users and the average chan-
nel gain of the eavesdropper
Target secrecy rate and
secrecy outage proba-
bility
A closed-form solution by problem
simplification
Traffic offloading via
dual-connectivity in
cellular networks [194]
Data rate and trans-
mission power
Perfect CSI of legitimate chan-
nel and statistics CSI of eaves-
dropper
Traffic demand and se-
crecy outage require-
ment
Performing a series of equivalent
transformations and proposing an
efficient algorithm to compute the
optimal offloading solution
jointly optimized to minimize the outage probability for delay-
limited secrecy information transmission based on the ap-
proaches of dual decomposition and alternating optimization.
In [189], the minimum secrecy outage probability is achieved
by optimizing the optimal placement of energy harvesting
node with physical layer security considerations. In [190],
the secrecy outage probability minimization problem and the
average harvested energy maximization problem in wireless
information and power transfer systems are solved by an
optimization framework of target secrecy rate and power
allocation ratio.
It is worth noting that the minimization of the secrecy
outage probability is dual to the maximization of the secrecy
outage capacity which is another optimization design related
to secrecy outage performance. As in [36], the packet data rate,
secrecy data rate, power, and subcarrier allocation policies of
an OFDMA DF relay network are designed to maximize the
average secrecy outage capacity by the dual decomposition
and gradient method. In [191], the solutions of the optimal
relay power allocations for a massive MIMO DF relay net-
work are derived for maximizing the secrecy outage capacity
and minimizing the interception probability, respectively. The
results in [191] are expanded in [48], in which to cope with the
nonconvexity of the joint node power and transmission time
allocation problem, the approach of alternating optimization is
addressed by maximizing over some of the variables and then
maximizing over the rest.
3) Minimization of power consumption: The power con-
sumption of physical-layer secure communications can also
be decreased by the designs of secure resource allocation
strategies. To be specific, by optimal resource allocation, we
can consume as less power as possible to achieve different
requirements of secure QoS, as shown in Table IV. The use
of AN or jamming signals can deteriorate the wiretap channel,
but it also increases the total power consumption. Therefore,
the optimal power allocation between the desired information
and AN/jamming signals is very important for saving power. In
a MISO system in [86], the optimal power allocation between
transmitted information and AN is developed for minimizing
the transmission power while ensuring a given probability
of secrecy. In [192] where a multiuser MISO network with
friendly jamming is considered, the power allocation strategy
is optimized to minimize the total power allocated to the
information signals and jamming signals while maintaining
secure QoS requirements. A non-orthogonal multiple access
system is considered in [193] where a closed-form solution
is derived to minimize the transmission power. Additionally,
considering the application scenario where an user communi-
cates simultaneously with a macro base station and a small-
cell access point, a joint optimization of traffic scheduling
and power allocation problem is formulated in [194] with
the objective of minimizing the total power consumption
while meeting both the user’s traffic demand and secrecy
requirement.
4) Maximization of secure EE: Secure resource allocation
is also effectively used for improving the EE of physical-layer
secure communications. To the best of our knowledge, the
concept of secrecy capacity per unit cost is defined in [195]
to study the cost-efficient wide-band secrecy communications,
in which the cost of the secrecy capacity may be the number
of channel use, the duration of transmission, or the amount
of energy consumption. The research status of secure EE
maximization by resource allocation can be summarized from
the following aspects.
• Multiuser multiple-access networks: The secure EE max-
imization of an OFDMA downlink network is studied in
[51] where the power, secrecy data rate, and subcarrier
allocation policies are optimized based on fractional
programming and dual decomposition. In a time-division
multiple-access network considered in [196], the secure
EE measured by the average energy consumption of the
system per transmitted information bit is investigated by
using Markov decision process and cross layer design
techniques, where information flow and joint optimization
of higher and physical layer is permitted. To tackle the
problem in [196], the strategies of packet scheduling
and transmitter buffering are designed while the heuristic
algorithm of simulated annealing is used to solve the op-
timization problem due to its advantage to help avoiding
local minima.
• Multi-antenna networks: The energy-efficient resource
allocation is carried out in multi-antenna networks in
17
[197] with different CSI scenarios involving perfect CSI,
partial CSI, and statical CSI. The work is expanded in
[198] by using the strategy of AN, while the fractional
programming and the sequential convex optimization tool
are introduced to tackle the nonconvex problem. In [199],
based on the optimization framework of [197] and [198],
two EE metrics are optimized, namely the metric of
secret bits per Joule and the metric of secret-key EE
which is defined as the ratio between the system secret-
key capacity and the consumed power. In particular in
[163], [173], [200], the optimization problems of energy-
efficient secure communications are formulated by using
an specific secure EE metric which is therein defined as
the ratio of the secrecy outage capacity to the total power
consumption.
• Relay networks: In [64], [115], [172], the energy-efficient
power allocation is developed for DF, AF, and untrusted
two-way relay networks, respectively. To deal with the
nonconvexity of the problems, several optimization ap-
proaches are jointly applied, which involve fractional
programming, penalty function method, alternating opti-
mization, DC programming. The EE of repetition coding
and parallel coding relaying under the partial secrecy
regime is investigated by power allocation in [201] based
on the fractional programming and a golden section
search algorithm.
• Cognitive radio networks: To implement the energy-
efficient secure communications in cognitive radio net-
works in [202], the optimal power allocation and power
splitting at the secondary transmitter are optimized un-
der secrecy constraints, while an EE Stackelberg game
between the primary and secondary transmitters is for-
mulated for maximizing their utilities. In [203], the
medium access probability and transmission power of
secondary transmitters are jointly optimized to maximize
the secure EE of the secondary network. In [204], a
secure EE maximization problem is established under
the constraints of data rate and transmission power of
the cognitive transmission as well as the interference
limitation to the primary user, which is solved based on
the fractional programming, penalty function method, and
DC programming.
• The tradeoff between energy and secrecy: The tradeoff
between energy and secrecy also attracts many concerns
recently [175], [205]–[207]. In [175] and [205], the
tradeoff between energy and secrecy is explored from
an information-theoretic perspective, while the metric of
partial secrecy is proposed to characterize the secrecy
level of a communication system by looking jointly at
the application layer metric and physical layer secrecy
metric. In [206], a framework is developed to study the
spectrum efficiency (SE) and EE for secure transmission
in underlaid random cognitive radio networks, and the
joint secure SE and EE optimization problem is formu-
lated therein by using an unified secure SE-EE tradeoff
metric. The energy-efficient secure communication in
large-scale device-to-device underlaid cellular networks
is investigated in [207], in which a link adaptation scheme
is proposed to strike a balance between secure EE and
SE by maximizing the weighted product of secure EE
and SE.
It is observed that, the most of the secure EE maximization
formulations are nonconvex, so that they are very intractable in
practice. Therefore, some nonconvex optimization methods are
introduced to cope with the challenges, such as the fractional
programming, penalty function method, alternating optimiza-
tion, DC programming, etc. To be specific, the fractional
programming can transform the secure EE function (which
is a fractional function) into a parameterized polynomial
subtractive form which can be tackled by the Dinkelbach
algorithm. The penalty function method is able to eliminate
the nonconvex constraint of secrecy rate by incorporating
the constraint into the objective function. In some cases,
the optimization problem is nonconvex or unsolvable for all
variables, but it is tractable when we tackle the problem
with some of the variables and then tackle it with the rest.
Such characteristics are beneficial to implement alternating
optimization. Towards the optimization problem in which the
objective function can be reformulated as a difference of two
convex functions, the DC programming is an effective method
which solves the problem iteratively by solving a series of
convex subproblems. The explanations of these optimization
methods can be found in Table V.
B. Secure Beamforming and Precoding
The deployments of multiple antennas or nodes in wire-
less networks facilitate the technologies of MIMO or virtual
MIMO to be applied extensively, which provide abundant op-
portunities to perform secure beamforming and precoding [8],
[9], [12], [22]. It has been demonstrated that, by beamforming
and precoding in multi-antenna and multi-node cooperative
networks, we can obtain some benefits in terms of secrecy rate,
secrecy outage probability, power consumption, and secure
EE. Naturally, to gain these benefits, the optimization designs
on beamforming and precoding can be solved with the four
performance metrics in practice.
1) Maximization of achievable secrecy rate: Following the
extensive applications of multi-antenna technologies, secure
beamforming and precoding have been paid increasing con-
cerns for secrecy rate improvements [9]. It is verified in
[216] that exploiting space-time diversity at a multi-antenna
transmitter can enhance information security and information-
hiding capabilities. After that, to improve the secrecy rate of
multi-antenna networks, some optimal or suboptimal schemes
of secure beamforming/precoding have been proposed for
multifarious scenarios based on different methods.
a) Conventional beamforming/precoding: The conven-
tional beamforming/precoding schemes, such as MRT, sig-
nal/AN null space, and GSVD, are applied separately or
jointly for secrecy enhancements, due to the inherent simplic-
ity and easy implementation. For achieving a better secrecy
performance, power allocation is usually optimized for these
schemes. The MRT beamforming controls the beam towards
the intended user for strengthening its received signals. Since
the MRT beamforming may lead to information leakage on
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TABLE V
THE EXPLANATIONS OF SEVERAL OPTIMIZATION METHODS USED FOR SECURE EE MAXIMIZATION
Optimization
methods
Problem formulations Problem transformations Algorithm procedures
Fractional
programming
[208], [209]
max
{
f(x) =
h(x)
g(x)
}
s.t. x ∈ D
Being related to the
parameterized problem
max {h(x) − εg(x) : x ∈ D}
with parameter ε.
1) For a given initial value x0, calculate ε1 =
h(x0)
g(x0)
; let
iterative index i = 1.
2) For εi, calculate the optimal solution xi by solving the
parameterized problem.
3) Stopping test with xi: If true, then stop; otherwise, go to
step 4).
4) For obtained xi, calculate εi+1 =
h(xi)
g(xi)
, i := i+ 1, and
return to step 2).
Penalty
function
method
[210], [211]
min f(x)
s.t.


lk(x) ≤ 0
x ∈ D,
where k = 1, · · · , m.
Defining a penalty function
L(x) , max{0, lk(x)}k
for the nonconvex constraints
lk(x) ≤ 0, and transforming
the problem formulation into
min{f(x) + τL(x) : x ∈ D},
where τ > 0 is a penalty factor.
1) Choose a small penalty factor τ0 and an increasing factor
ρ for updating τ . Let iterative index i = 0.
2) For τi, calculate the optimal xi by solving the resulting
penalty problem.
3) Stopping test with xi: If true, then stop; otherwise, go to
step 4).
4) Update τ by τi+1 = ρτi, i := i+1, and return to step 2).
Alternating
optimization
[212], [213]
min f(x)
s.t. x ∈ D
By partitioning the variables x into
two subsets y and z, the problem
can be iteratively solved by tack-
ling the following subproblems
min
y
{f(y, zi) : y∈D(y, zi)}
min
z
{f(yi+1,z) : z∈D(yi+1,z)}
1) Choose a starting point x0 = (y0,z0) and let iterative
index i = 0.
2) For the given zi, find the optimal solution yi+1 of
min
y
{f(y, zi) : y ∈ D(y, zi)}.
3) For the given yi+1, find the optimal solution zi+1 of
min
z
{f(yi+1,z) : z ∈ D(yi+1,z)} .
4) Stopping test with (yi+1, zi+1): If true, then stop; other-
wise, let i := i+ 1 and go to step 2).
DC
programming
[214], [215]
min{f(x)=f1(x)−f2(x)}
s.t. x ∈ D,
where D, f1(x), and
f2(x) are convex.
Being solved iteratively by tack-
ling min{f1(x) − f2(xi) −
〈∇f2(xi),x − xi〉 : x ∈ D},
where ∇ denotes the gradient of
a function and 〈·, ·〉 denotes dot
product.
1) Choose a starting point x0 and let iterative index i = 0.
2) For fixed xi, find the optimal solution xi+1 of
min{f1(x) − f2(xi)− 〈∇f2(xi),x− xi〉 : x ∈ D}.
3) Stopping test with xi+1: If true, then stop; otherwise, go
to step 4).
4) Let i := i+ 1 and go to step 2).
the direction to the eavesdropper, the AN null-space beam-
forming can then be exploited to disrupt the reception at the
eavesdropper by emitting AN on the null space of legitimate
channels. Such a joint scheme with MRT and AN null-space
beamforming is of particular interest in practice when the
eavesdropper’s CSI is unavailable. If the transmitter has the
full CSI of the eavesdropper, the ZF beamforming can then
be performed to overcome the faults of information leakage to
the eavesdropper by completely suppressing the beam towards
the eavesdropper. To tradeoff the intended received signal
and information leakage to eavesdropper or other users, RCI
precoding is proposed based on a real regularization param-
eter which can be designed for secrecy rate improvements.
When all nodes in a network are equipped with multiple
antennas while the perfect CSI of all nodes is available, the
GSVD precoding can be implemented to decompose both the
legitimate channels and the wiretap channels into a set of
parallel independent subchannels which can be used separately
to transmit different messages. The works on the conven-
tional beamforming/precoding schemes are compared in Table
VI. Noteworthily, these conventional beamforming/precoding
schemes are suboptimal in many situations, and the optimal
designs in this field have therefore attracted great interest.
b) Optimal beamforming/precoding: To achieve the
optimal secrecy performance, the strategy of beamform-
ing/precoding is carefully designed by optimization ap-
proaches. The precoding matrix design for maximizing the
secrecy capacity Cs(W) in a standard three-node (two legit-
imate users and an eavesdropper) MIMO wiretap network is
formulated as [83]
max
W
Cs(W)
s.t. Tr(W) ≤ Pmax,W  0,
(39)
where W is the precoding matrix with the maximum power
constraint Pmax and the positive semidefinite constraint W 
0. Such a nonconvex problem is solved by alternating opti-
mization and dual decomposition, while the resulting algo-
rithm is extended to the scenario with destination jamming.
In [68], the linear precoding strategies for secrecy rate maxi-
mization in multiuser multiantenna networks are investigated
in the broadcasting and multicasting scenarios, and an it-
erative algorithm based on second-order cone programming
is proposed with low complexity and provable convergence.
Focusing on the secure communications in dual-polarized
MIMO systems, a scheme of dual-structured precoding is
addressed in [217] in which a preprocessing matrix based on
the polarized array spatial correlation and a linear precoding
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TABLE VI
THE COMPARISONS OF THE WORKS ON THE CONVENTIONAL BEAMFORMING/PRECODING SCHEMES
Schemes CSI conditions Expression/Constraints Explanations
Joint MRT and AN
null-space beamform-
ing [42], [58], [62],
[63], [88]
Legitimate CSI W = HH/‖H‖ and
HZ = 0
Controlling the beam towards the intended user while Emitting
AN on the null space of legitimate channels. The performance can
be improved by power allocation between AN and information-
bearing signal.
ZF beamforming
[58]–[61]
Legitimate and
wiretap CSI
W = HH(HHH )−1 or
HeW
H = 0
Eliminating information leakage to the eavesdropper. This strategy
is generally obtained by HH (HHH)−1 or optimized with the
constraint HeW
H = 0 in system designs.
RCI precoding [78]–
[82]
Legitimate CSI W = HH (HHH+αI)−1 To balance the intended signal and information leakage by de-
signing a regularization parameter α. The secrecy performance of
this strategy can be improved by power allocation.
GSVD precoding
[26], [28], [74]–[77]
Legitimate and
wiretap CSI
HW = UA and HeW =
UeAe
Performing GSVD for matrix (H,He), and returning the precod-
ing matrix W, unitary matrices U and Ue, nonnegative diagonal
matrices A and Ae. Power allocation can also be optimized for
secrecy improvements in this strategy.
*Notations: H, He, W, and Z denote the matrices of legitimate channels, wiretap channels, beamforming/precoding, and AN, respectively.
scheme based on different CSI are concatenated. The secure
beamforming for typical three-node (two legitimate users and
a relay) MIMO relay networks is explored in [52] and [29],
where the untrusted relay is treated as an eavesdropper. To
reduce the difficulties of the joint designs in [52] and [29],
the alternating optimization is used to iteratively deal with the
source and the relay beamforming in an alternate fashion. To
solve the resulting subproblems from alternating optimization,
the SDP is introduced in the both works to transform a
fractional quadratically constrained quadratic problem into
a SDP problem by the technique of SDR [218] and the
rank-one matrix decomposition theorem [219]. Besides, the
beamforming for maximizing the secrecy rate in simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer is designed in [54],
[220], [221], where the optimal solutions are derived also
based on SDR. More specifically, by relaxing the rank-one
constraint, the considered optimization problems are therein
constructed as SDP problems which can be solved easily by
some existing optimization techniques and rank-one reduction
[54], [220]–[222].
2) Minimization of secrecy outage probability: In physi-
cal layer security, the potential of secure beamforming and
precoding for minimizing secrecy outage probability has also
been explored in recent years. Naturally, the existing beam-
forming/precoding schemes mentioned in the last subsection
can also be used to achieve the goal of secrecy outage proba-
bility reduction. As in [159], the AN-assisted beamforming is
performed for degrading the eavesdroppers’ channels while the
optimal power allocation between the confidential information
and AN is obtained in closed form to minimize the secrecy rate
outage probability. In [156], the outage probability of secure
transmission is minimized by the single-stream beamforming
(based on MRT and ZF beamforming) and the use of AN
in the null space of the legitimate channels. When only the
location information of the eavesdropper is available at the
source user in [223], [224], the location-based beamforming is
optimally designed to minimize the secrecy outage probability
in Rician wiretap channels, while the resulting solution is
extended to examine the solution of the optimal beamformer
in the presence of a multi-antenna jammer [224]. To transmit
information securely in millimeter-wave (mm-Wave) MISO-
OFDM systems with partial channel knowledge, a hybrid
precoder is implemented in [225] by an iterative design with
the objective of minimizing the secrecy outage probability.
3) Minimization of power consumption: In the existing
literature, secure beamforming and precoding are also used
to support the designs of power minimization in different sce-
narios. The beamforming for minimizing transmission power
in relay networks is investigated in [53], [59], [91], [154]
with different constraints. The typical mathematical model for
minimizing the total power of the source and relays under a
target secrecy rate constraint Rs ≥ R0s is given as [59], [154]
min
Ps,w
{Ps + ‖w‖2}
s.t. Rs(Ps,w ) ≥ R0s,
(40)
where Ps and w are the source power and the relay weights,
respectively. In particular in [91], the beamformer of the relays
is optimized to minimize the power allocated for transmitting
confidential information, so that as much power as possible can
be used to transmit AN to confuse the eavesdropper. In [226]
where a secure multiuser broadcast system is considered, the
optimal precoding matrix at the base station and the jamming
covariance matrix at the friendly jammer are jointly designed
to minimize the total transmission power under the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constraints at the users
and eavesdroppers. In [227], the transmission beamforming is
performed for minimizing the power consumption of a full-
duplex base station considering both self-interference mitiga-
tion and physical layer security. Additionally, the physical
layer security in satellite communication is considered in
[170] where the beamforming and power allocation under the
individual secrecy rate constraints are designed for minimizing
the overall transmission power used by all beams. In a new
cognitive radio network as described in [228], a cooperative
beamforming scheme is proposed to minimize the transmission
power of a secondary transmitter while providing different
20
SINR for an eavesdropper, a primary receiver, and multiple
secondary receivers.
The problems of power minimization by beamform-
ing/precoding are also raised in simultaneous wireless infor-
mation and power transfer systems considering multifarious
settings.
• Multi-antenna broadcast networks: In such settings, si-
multaneous wireless information and power transfer is
implemented by transmission beamforming which is de-
signed to jointly or separately satisfy the constraints of se-
crecy rate, secrecy outage probability, energy-harvesting
outage probability, and received SINR ratio [229]–[235].
In order to achieve secure transmission, the transmission
beamforming is also aided with AN strategy in many
works [230]–[235].
• Distributed antenna systems: In [236], the beamforming
and AN vectors are jointly optimized to minimize the
total transmission power while providing QoS for reliable
communication and efficient power transfer in a given
time slot, in which the capacity-limited backhaul links is
taken into account.
• Multi-cell multigroup multicast systems: In [237], two
different optimization targets are considered for a multi-
cell multigroup MISO system, i.e., power minimization
and SINR balancing. The centralized and distributed
beamforming algorithms are proposed for the considered
optimization problems, based on the techniques of SDR
and alternating optimization.
• Cognitive radio networks: Simultaneous wireless infor-
mation and power transfer are raised in cognitive radio
networks in [238], [239]. In [238], the total transmis-
sion power at the energy transmitter and the secondary
transmitter is minimized by a cooperative precoding
design while satisfying secrecy rate, energy harvesting,
and interference temperature constraints. In [239], the
total transmission power of the secondary transmitter is
minimized while ensuring that the QoS requirement on
secure communication is satisfied.
It is noted that, in many works, the technique of SDR is ex-
tensively adopted in the designs of transmission beamforming
[229], [231]–[235], [239], such that an approximation problem
can be directly obtained and solved by the method of SDP. In
general, the resulting relaxed problem by SDR cannot ensure
to get a rank-one solution. It always acts as an upper bound
of the performance for the original problem [218]. In some
cases, the solution obtained by SDR is provably optimal, or
the rank of the solution can be reduced by some techniques of
rank reduction. Noteworthily, solving the SDP problem may
result in relatively poor performance if SDP returns a high-
rank solution. To overcome the difficulty, a method termed as
SPCA [240], [241] is usually employed to find a suboptimal
solution [229], [231]. The SPCA method approximates the
nonconvex constraints by an upper convex estimate, and then
results in a problem which can be solved directly. The two
methods are briefly compared in Table VII.
4) Maximization of secure EE: The energy-efficient beam-
forming and precoding in physical layer security have also
been given many attentions. In [71], the energy-efficient
precoder design in a conventional three-node (including a
transmitter, a legitimate receiver, and an eavesdropper) MIMO
wiretap channel is proposed based on the fractional program-
ming and Taylor series expansion. In [174], by providing a
second-order approximation to the MIMO secrecy capacity
with its first and second derivatives, the metric of minimum bit
energy is examined for secure and reliable communications in
the low-SNR regime while characterizing the tradeoff between
EE and secrecy. A beamformer design is performed in [243]
for secure and energy-efficient wireless communication over
MIMO channels with multiple user pairs and an eavesdropper,
where a path-following computational procedure is proposed
to cope with the intractable nonconvex problem and to yield
at least a locally optimal solution. In [244], the robust energy-
efficient transmission design for MISOME wiretap channels is
investigated by the fractional programming and tight convex
relaxation, so that the primal fractional optimization problem
is solved by solving a sequence of SDP problems. The energy-
efficient beamforming for secure cognitive communication
is raised in [245], in which the primal problem is tackled
by the combined use of the fractional programming and
DC programming. In addition, in a MIMOME network with
simultaneous wireless information and power transfer [246],
the transmission covariance matrices and power splitting ratio
for decoding information and harvesting energy are designed
jointly to maximize the secure EE, where the fractional
programming and alternating optimization are also employed
for handling the nonconvexity of the optimization problem.
C. Antenna/Node Selection and Cooperation
Antenna/node selection and cooperation in multi-antenna
and multi-node wireless networks have been well exploited
for achieving different performance requirements of physical
layer security. Being similar to the former subsections, the
state of the art of optimization designs in this research topic
can also be reviewed from the four categories of optimization
problems.
1) Maximization of achievable secrecy rate: Great efforts
have been made for the optimization designs of antenna/node
selection and cooperation to increase the achievable secrecy
rate. Multi-antenna diversity can provide the gain of secrecy
rate by designing proper strategy of antenna selection, as
investigated in [93], [95], [247]. In multiuser scenarios, user
selecting/scheduling can bring the improvement of secrecy
rate by using multiuser diversity, such as the optimal and
suboptimal scheduling in a multiuser MISO system [145],
the maximum instantaneous SNR scheduling and approximate
proportional fair scheduling in a multiuser MISO system
with a multi-antenna eavesdropper [108], and the round-robin
user scheduling as well as the optimal and suboptimal user
scheduling in a cognitive radio network [103], [104].
In cooperative networks, the broadcast feature of wireless
transmission results in two aspects, namely node cooperation
and data secrecy [248]. Node cooperation means that users can
help improve each other’s rate by intelligently using their re-
ceived signals. Data secrecy implies that the information leak-
age to the undesired users may cause some severe problems of
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TABLE VII
THE COMPARISONS OF SDR AND SPCA
Optimization methods Problem formulations Problem transformations Comments
SDR [218], [242]
min
x∈Rn
x
TA0x
s.t. xTAix ≥ bi,
where Ai are symmet-
ric square matrices, i =
0, 1, 2, · · · .
By defining X = xxT which is equivalent to X
being a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix with
rank one constraint rank(X) = 1, we get that
x
TAix = Tr(AiX). By ignoring rank(X) = 1,
we obtain a relaxed problem known as an SDP:
min
X
Tr(A0X)
s.t.


Tr(AiX) ≥ bi, i = 1, 2, · · ·
X  0.
The core idea of the method is that we
drop the rank-one constraint to obtain
a SDP problem. The SDP problem
can be handled very conveniently by
readily available software packages.
However, the resulting SDP problem
may lead to relatively poor perfor-
mance if SDP returns a high-rank
solution.
SPCA [240], [241]
min
x∈Rn
f(x)
s.t. li(x)≤0, i=1, 2, · · ·
where f(x) is convex,
and li(x) is nonconvex.
By defining a function Li(x, ϕi) which is a con-
vex upper approximation of the nonconvex function
li(x), i.e., li(x) ≤ Li(x, ϕi), the original prob-
lem can be approximated by the following convex
problem:
min
x∈Rn
f(x)
s.t. Li(x, ϕi) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · ,
where ϕi is a slack variable which is updated at each
iteration.
The basic idea of the method is that,
at each iteration, we replace each of
the nonconvex constraints by its upper
convex approximation function with
an appropriate ϕi. Thus, the method
is required to iteratively solve a con-
vex problem based on convex opti-
mization. The difficulty of the method
is to carefully choose the upper con-
vex estimates and slack variables.
information security. Accordingly, node cooperation and data
secrecy have been studied jointly in multi-node cooperative
scenarios in recent years. The cooperative nodes act two roles
in physical layer security, including cooperative relaying and
cooperative jamming [9]–[12], [18], [249]. Cooperative relay-
ing is to enhance the legitimate channels while cooperative
jamming is to degrade the wiretap channels. In practice, the
cooperative nodes may be trusted or untrusted. For the trusted
nodes, they can be used for relaying and jamming separately
or jointly [18]. As to untrusted nodes, seeking for cooperative
relaying or jamming with them may be better than treating
them as pure eavesdroppers [121], [122]. According to the
roles of the cooperative nodes, there are generally four kinds of
node-assisted transmission designs, which involve cooperative
relaying, cooperative jamming, hybird cooperative relaying
and jamming, and cooperative relaying with AN [12], [30],
as illustrated in Fig. 7.
• Cooperative relaying: When the channels from the source
to the destination are too poor or even nonexistent, signal
retransmission by intermediate nodes is an effective way
for confidential data transmissions, as shown in Fig. 7(a).
Seeking for cooperative relaying with the intermediate
nodes, the confidential data can be delivered securely
and reliably, while some signal processing technologies
can be applied into system designs to achieve both
the performance requirements and resource saving. The
typical cooperative relaying supported by beamforming to
improve secrecy rate is investigated in [29], [52], [58]–
[61], [154], [250], where the relays are trusted [58]–
[61], [154], [250], [251] or untrusted [29], [52]. The
optimal power control for multi-hop relaying is raised
in [44]. The optimal relay selection and relay placement
for cooperative relaying are concerned in [109] and [252],
respectively. In [110], three opportunistic relay selection
schemes are studied for maximizing the Shannon capacity
to the destination as well as for minimizing that to the
eavesdroppers. According to [110] and [132], the relay
selection schemes can be sorted into four categories, as
listed in Table VIII.
• Cooperative jamming: When there is the direct channel
from the source to the destination, the relays can be used
as jammers to emit artificial interference, such that the
channels to the eavesdropper are degraded and the confi-
dential information is protected against eavesdropping, as
depicted in Fig. 7(b). A simple but suboptimal jamming
strategy is null-space cooperative jamming which emits
artificial interference in the null space of the channels
from the relays to the destination. Such a null-space
jamming strategy degrades only the wiretap channels
while with no influence to the legitimate channels. Trying
to obtain the optimal cooperative jamming designs, the
solutions of jamming signal weights are elaborated in
[59], [147], and [154]. In [28], two types of cooper-
ative jamming schemes referred to as full cooperative
jamming and partial cooperative jamming are proposed
depending on that whether both the transmitter and the
temporary helpers (which are acted by the source and the
destination) transmit jamming signals at the same time.
The secure transmissions with and without cooperative
jamming are compared in [39] based on the worst-case
optimization. Using the intermediate nodes to relay or
to jam, which is a better choice? Such a problem in-
volving cooperative mode decision is discussed in [129],
in which the performance comparison between the relay
transmission scheme and the direct transmission scheme
with jamming is examined in the distance normalized
SNR regime. Additionally, in [129], it is also concluded
that, in the high distance normalized SNR regime, the
direct transmission scheme provides higher secrecy rate
compared with the relay transmission scheme, while
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precoding
Fig. 7. Different strategies of intermediate node assisted transmission in cooperative networks.
in the low distance normalized SNR regime, the relay
transmission scheme outperforms the direct transmission
scheme.
• Hybrid cooperative relaying and jamming: A more
widely-used strategy is hybrid cooperative relaying and
jamming which is based on the combined application of
the two methods. In such a hybrid strategy, the inter-
mediate nodes are grouped as relays and jammers. The
relays retransmit the received confidential information
to improve the signal quality at the destination while
the jammers continuously emit artificial interference to
confuse the eavesdroppers, as illustrated in Fig 7(c). This
may take the confidential information under protection
in all stages of cooperative transmission. As in [132],
[133], [138], [142]–[144], the hybrid cooperative relaying
and jamming are investigated in different settings where
joint relay and jammer selection are also taken into
account. A multiuser relaying scheme with the intended
user jamming is proposed in [102] where the optimal
user selection is also considered in the sense of max-
imizing the secrecy rate. In [123], the untrusted two-
way relaying with friendly jammers is investigated based
on Stackelberg game. In [146], a hybrid relaying and
jamming scheme with the optimal relay selection and
power allocation is developed for maximizing the secrecy
rate, in which the destination and the source are used as
jammers to jam the eavesdropper in the first and second
phase of cooperative transmissions, respectively.
• Cooperative relaying with AN: In this strategy, as shown
in Fig. 7(d), the relays are used to forward confiden-
tial information and transmit AN simultaneously. To
be specific, the confidential information retransmitted at
each relay is superimposed with an AN. This strategy
subsumes all the above three designs and makes better
use of available degrees of freedom at relays [30]. As
a result, the combined designs of cooperative relay-
ing and AN precoding have been widely considered in
physical layer security, such as in [30], [117], [253],
[254]. Noteworthily, it is generally challenging to jointly
optimize AN precoding and relay beamforming [30].
Therefore, some suboptimal but effective schemes have
been proposed. The joint AN-aided beamforming and
power allocation are studied in [28], where a closed-form
jamming beamformer and a GSVD-based secure relaying
scheme with each corresponding optimal power allocation
are developed for the cases of single and multiple stream
data transmissions, respectively. In [255], for a single-
relay MIMO wiretap channel, an interference alignment
approach is addressed to obtain a simplified and subop-
timal design of AN-assisted cooperative relaying.
2) Minimization of secrecy outage probability: The spatial
diversity provided by multiple antennas and nodes can be
effectively utilized for reducing the secrecy outage probabil-
ity in multi-antenna and multi-node networks. The antenna
selection for enhancing the secrecy outage performance has
been investigated for MIMOME networks [100], [256], MIMO
relay networks [257], non-orthogonal multiple access systems
[258], and cognitive radio networks [259]. The antenna selec-
tion combined with AN is proposed for decreasing the secrecy
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TABLE VIII
RELAY SELECTION SCHEMES
Schemes Mathematical formulations Achievable secrecy rates Explanations
Conventional selection k∗ = argmax
k∈Ω
{
γk,D
}
Cs = max
k∈Ω
{Ck,D} − Ck∗,E The relay which has the highest instantaneous SNR
of the relay-destination links will be selected for
relaying.
Minimum selection k∗ = argmin
k∈Ω
{
γk,E
}
Cs = Ck∗,D −min
k∈Ω
{Ck,E} The relay that has the lowest instantaneous SNR
of the relay-eavesdropper links will be selected for
relaying.
Optimal selection k∗ = argmin
k∈Ω
{
1+γk,D
1+γk,E
}
Cs = Ck∗,D − Ck∗,E The optimal selection incorporates the quality of both
links into the selection decision metric. The relay
that has the highest achievable secrecy rate will be
selected for relaying.
Suboptimal selection k∗=argmin
k∈Ω
{
γk,D
E{γk,E}
}
Cs = Ck∗,D − E
{
Ck∗,E
}
The suboptimal selection scheme selects the appro-
priate relay based on the statistical knowledge of the
relay-eavesdropper links. The scheme can avoid the
instantaneous estimate of the wiretap channels.
*Notations: Cs is the secrecy rate. k∗ is the selected relay from the relay set Ω. γk,D and γk,E are the instantaneous SNR of the links from relay
k to the destination and the eavesdropper, respectively. Ck,D and Ck,E are the channel capacity of the links from relay k to the destination and
the eavesdropper, respectively. E{·} denotes expectation.
outage probability in secure two-way relaying communications
in [260]. In multi-node scenarios, the relay and jammer
selection in DF relay networks are studied separately or jointly
for minimizing the secrecy outage probability in [112], [136].
The best relay and user pair selection for minimizing the
secrecy outage probability of a multiuser AF relay network
are addressed in [113], in which the analytical expressions of
the secrecy outage probability are also derived for the proposed
three selection criteria. The selections of the transmission pro-
tocols are also investigated in literature [261], [262]. In [261],
the secure transmission protocol which switches between DF
beamforming and cooperative jamming is proposed for the
purpose of maximizing secrecy rate and minimizing secrecy
outage probability in different communication scenarios. A
secure opportunistic transmission protocol that aims at finding
an optimal scheme between direct transmission and relaying
transmission, is developed in [262] to achieve the lowest
secrecy outage probability of cooperative wireless networks.
Some works also consider designing the strategies of node
selection and cooperation to reduce the secrecy outage proba-
bility of cooperative energy harvesting networks [263]–[265].
In [263], the relay and jammer selection are considered for
the cooperative energy harvesting networks with a friendly
jammer. In [264], the secrecy outage probability of a wireless
powered communication network with an energy harvesting
jammer is analyzed and minimized by optimizing the time
allocation between the two phases of information transfer
and energy transfer. The work presented in [264] is extended
to a more general multiuser situation with an additional
consideration of jamming power allocation in [265].
3) Minimization of power consumption: Although multiple
node cooperation can support the improvements of information
security, multiple nodes used for information transmission
may bring additional power consumption. In particular, some
cooperative nodes may consume high power but bring incon-
siderably improvement of secrecy. Accordingly, node selection
and cooperation for saving power while ensuring secure QoS
requirements have been also studied in physical layer security.
As investigated in [114], the so-called power-efficient secure
communication is discussed with the objective of power mini-
mization by optimal relay selection. In [266], a secure adaptive
relay cooperation approach is developed to ensure wireless
information security in an untrusted relay network with relay
energy harvesting, while a greedy battery-aware relay selection
scheme is proposed to minimize the power consumption in
such a network.
4) Maximization of secure EE: It has been verified that
antenna/node selection and cooperation also can bring the
gain of secure EE. In [267], the secure EE of a cooperative
MIMO relay network is investigated, in which transmit an-
tenna selection and MRC are deployed at the transmitter and
the receivers, respectively. Considering three possible cooper-
ation scenarios in [268], namely the jammer only, relay only,
and the relay-jammer pair, the adaptive cooperation schemes
are addressed for energy-efficient physical layer security. In
[269], hybrid full-/half-duplex receiver deployment strategies
are proposed for wireless ad hoc networks to optimize the
network-wide secrecy throughput and network-wide secure
EE, respectively. The potential advantages of massive MIMO
technologies are also explored for improving secure EE [270],
[271]. In [270], the potential benefits of massive MIMO aided
heterogeneous cloud radio access networks are explored in
terms of the secrecy and EE. In [271], the advantages of
massive MIMO relaying are utilized to improve the secure
EE which is specially defined as the ratio of the secrecy
outage capacity to the total power consumption. Moreover,
the energy-efficient secure communication over a large-scale
wireless network is studied by the combined application of
game theory and stochastic geometry in [272]. An alternating
optimization scheme is proposed therein for maximizing the
secure EE of the legitimate transmitters by controlling the node
activation probability, confidential message rate, redundancy
rate, and the number of active antennas. In addition, an energy-
efficient node activation game between the transmitters and the
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eavesdroppers is also studied therein, where the transmitters
and the eavesdroppers control their node activation probabil-
ities to maximize the secrecy EE and the eavesdropping EE,
respectively.
VI. THE IMPACTS OF CSI ON PHYSICAL-LAYER SECURITY
DESIGNS
It has been discussed that the priori knowledge of the
legitimate and wiretap channels’ CSI is very important for the
choices of secrecy metrics and the designs of secrecy strategies
[12]. To achieve the optimal performance of secure transmis-
sion, the perfect CSI of both the legitimate and wiretap chan-
nels is indispensable for system designs. For getting the CSI of
the legitimate channels, some conventional methods (such as
training/estimation and feedback), being similar to that in the
traditional communications without secrecy constraints, can
be used in physical layer security designs. However, due to
the existences of estimation error and feedback delay in some
cases, it may be difficult in practice to get the perfect CSI of
legitimate channels. Regarding the CSI of wiretap channels, it
can be obtained perfectly when the eavesdroppers are also the
legitimate users of the network but have different service from
that of the intended users. However, when the eavesdroppers
are passive, vicious or even hostile, it may be impossible to
get the perfect CSI of such eavesdroppers. According to the
above discussions, the following assumptions of CSI have been
considered in physical layer security, i.e., the perfect CSI of
all channels, the imperfect CSI of wiretap channels, and the
unknown CSI of wiretap channels.
A. The Perfect CSI of All Channels
In the literature on physical layer security, the perfect CSI of
all channels has been commonly assumed for designing the op-
timal transmission scheme which can match the instantaneous
changes of channel states, such as in [35], [38], [44], [52], [55],
[59]–[61], [109], [154]. In fact, the perfect CSI including that
of eavesdroppers, can be obtained at all communication nodes
in some situations. For instance, the eavesdropper is active
in the network and its transmissions can be monitored. This
case arises particularly in the practical applications combining
multicast and unicast transmissions, in which the user plays
double roles as legitimate receiver for some signals and
eavesdropper for others [59]. Alternatively, the eavesdropper
is also a legitimate user of the network whereas its service
differs from that of the intended user [61]. In other words,
instead of eavesdroppers, there can be friendly nodes in the
network that are not supposed to hear certain messages. This
case arises often in military communications, where lower
level network users can only access to less information [154].
Because the confidential information of the source user is
expected to be received only by the intended user, the other
users (they are even legitimate and friendly) in the network
should be treated as eavesdroppers for secure transmission
designs. However, such legitimate and friendly users can feed
back the perfect CSI to transmitters. Accordingly, the optimal
secure transmission designs can be performed with the perfect
CSI of all channels.
B. The Imperfect CSI of Wiretap Channels
In many situations, the perfect CSI of the main channel can
be easily obtained by channel estimation and CSI feedback,
whereas getting the perfect CSI of the wiretap channels is
very difficult or even impossible. In such cases, the imperfect
CSI of eavesdroppers may be obtained in practice, based on
the past channel observations or a priori knowledge of the
particular propagation environment [273], [274]. The uncer-
tainties of the imperfect eavesdropper’s CSI can be generally
characterized by three ways. The first way is that the channel
of eavesdropper follow some probability distributions [144],
[251], such as the Gaussian distribution, Rayleigh distribution,
Rician distribution, and so on. In this way, only the statistical
information of the eavesdroppers’ channels, i.e., the mean and
covariance of the probability distribution, is available for the
system designs, such as the assumptions in [40], [42], [51],
[58], [64]. The second way to characterize the uncertainties
of eavesdroppers’ channels is termed as the deterministic
uncertainty model in some literature [30], [39], [58], [170],
[234], [253], [275]. In the deterministic uncertainty model
which belongs to compound channel in information theory, the
unknown wiretap channels are assumed to fall in a sphere or
a set. To be specific, the uncertainty region of eavesdropper’s
channels is modeled as a sphere He with center h¯e and radius√
ǫ, that is [30], [39], [58], [170], [234], [253], [275]
He =
{
he|‖he − h¯e‖2 ≤ ǫ
}
=
{
h¯e + ve|‖ve‖2 ≤ ǫ
}
.
(41)
In (41), he, h¯e, ve, and ǫ > 0 denote the real channel vector
of eavesdropper, the estimated channel vector of eavesdropper,
the estimation error vector, and the channel mismatch, respec-
tively. By this model, we have that he ∈ He. The third way to
model the imperfect eavesdropper’s channels is based on the
imperfect channel estimate h¯e, the estimation error vector ve,
and a scalar κ ∈ [0, 1] for indicating the degree of channel
knowledge. This model can be expressed as [156], [276]
he =
√
κh¯e +
√
1− κve. (42)
In (42), if κ = 1, it means that the eavesdropper’s CSI is
perfect, while if κ = 0, it implies that we fail to get any CSI
of the eavesdroppers.
In some worse cases, the perfect CSI of both legitimate and
wiretap channels is unavailable due to limited feedback or
other reasons, such as discussed in [40], [45], [56]. Then, the
uncertainties of legitimate channels can also be characterized
by the three methods mentioned above. It is worth noting that,
towards the uncertainties of real channels, the robust secure
designs are commonly performed to ensure achieving the
security, reliability, and robustness of information transmission
[30], [39], [56], [234], [253], [275].
C. The Unknown CSI of Wiretap Channels
The assumption on the perfect CSI of all channels is
commonly used for calculating the instantaneous secrecy ca-
pacity and secrecy rate which are needed for instantaneous
optimization designs. Using the perfect CSI, the security and
reliability of information transmission can be guaranteed by
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secure coding and rate adaptation. However, a more practical
assumption is that the CSI of wiretap channels is completely
absent due to the concealment and hostility of eavesdroppers
[47], [91], [256], [277]. Moreover, whether there exists any
eavesdropper cannot be known in some situations. Because the
eavesdroppers’ CSI is unknown at the transmitters, the expres-
sion of the instantaneous secrecy rate is unavailable. Therefore,
the instantaneous optimization cannot be performed. Then, a
probabilistic view of security or a QoS-based optimization
can be considered for secure transmission designs. Such as in
[256], a strategy of transmission antenna selection to enhance
the secrecy performance of MIMO wiretap channels without
eavesdroppers’ CSI is proposed based on three important
metrics, i.e., the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, the
secrecy outage probability, and the ǫ-outage secrecy capacity.
In [47], secrecy sum rate maximization considering each user’s
QoS constraint and unknown eavesdropper’s CSI is investi-
gated for a non-orthogonal multiple access system. In [91], a
QoS-based secure strategy is addressed to enhance the security
of a cooperative relay network without eavesdropper’s CSI. It
is worth pointing out that, exploiting AN or jamming signal to
enhance secrecy has been demonstrated to be effective when
the eavesdropper’s CSI is unknown or imperfect [9].
VII. DISCUSSIONS ON FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND
CHALLENGES
It has been shown in previous sections that the physical layer
security has attracted increasing concerns. Some great progress
has been made in the fields of information-theoretical security
and optimal secure designs at physical layer. However, it has
been observed that many studies in the existing works are per-
formed with some special assumptions on CSI, eavesdropper
model, and application scenarios. These assumptions may be
unpractical or even contrary to real conditions. Therefore, there
are still many significant problems needed to be investigated to
promote the practical applicability of physical layer security.
In the following, some possible future directions and open
challenges are simply discussed. Since the future work in
physical layer security is very extensive, only a few directions
are discussed.
A. The Influences of Wireless Channels
The influences of wireless channels on secrecy must be
further studied. In literature, it is often assumed that the
channels to legitimate user and eavesdropper are uncorrelated.
The uncorrelated property is believed to be the foundation to
assume that the eavesdroppers cannot estimate the channels
of legitimate transceivers. However, this assumption has its
limitations considering some practical scenarios. For instance,
when the transceivers as well as the eavesdroppers lie in a
insufficiently rich scattering environment as discussed in [20],
the assumption of uncorrelated channels is then impractical.
In addition, much existing literature simply assume that the
channels are quasi-static or even completely static. However, if
the channels are somewhat dynamic, the resulting conclusions
in those works may be in conflict with the real settings. Fur-
thermore, the relative spatial locations between the transceivers
and eavesdroppers, as well as the node mobility model, may
have important impacts on wireless channels, which also need
to be considered in secure transmission designs. Besides, it is
already known that the secure strategy designs heavily depend
on the CSI of legitimate users and eavesdroppers, whereas the
perfect CSI is difficult to get in many situations due to the
limited estimation and feedback or other reasons.
The challenges stemmed from the aspect of wireless chan-
nels are because of the difficulties of accurate channel estima-
tion for wiretap channels, and the considerations of channel
correlations, time varying, and node mobility. First, how to get
the perfect CSI to achieve the optimal security performance
is difficult to deal with, especially when the eavesdropper is
inactive. Furthermore, accurate channel estimation may cause
unacceptably high overhead in pilot frequency and power
consumption. This is a particularly severe problem in massive
MIMO networks as the overhead may grow rapidly with the
antenna number. Even worse, the process of channel estimation
may be attacked by pilot contamination attack which not only
dramatically reduces the achievable secrecy capacity but is
also difficult to detect [17]. Second, high channel correlations
have been observed in [278] even when the spatial separation
is much larger than half-wavelength [279]. This indicates
that the spatial correlations of wireless channels may vary in
different environments and the half-wavelength decorrelation
assumption may not always hold [279]. Therefore, the secure
transmission designs considering the channel correlations is
also a challenging problem in future. Third, the time-varying
characteristics of channels and the mobility of terminals are
also severe issues in physical-layer secure communications
since the channel qualities may vary dramatically over time
and space. Therefore, how to simultaneously guarantee the
security, reliability, and robustness of a secure transmission
scheme with the problems mentioned above will be challeng-
ing in future work.
B. The Impacts of Adversary Model
The impacts of attack modes and adversary models are
also important issues for secure transmission that has not
yet been deeply explored. Much existing literature assumes
that the adversaries merely passively listen to the secure
communications. In other words, there are no collaboration
and information exchange among the adversaries. Neverthe-
less, the adversaries may actively collaborate and exchange
their outputs in practice to interpret the confidential messages
[280]. Moreover, a slightly more sophisticated adversary may
be able to predict the channels for improving the eaves-
dropping qualities. Some intelligent adversaries may attempt
to manipulate the propagation environment for strengthening
their advantages and undermining information security [281],
[282]. When these observations discussed above are taken into
account, the transmission strategy designs for physical layer
security will be facing great challenges.
The challenges in this direction can be discussed from the
following aspects. On the one hand, the optimization and
design in physical layer security will become more compli-
cated when hybrid attacks are imposed on wireless information
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transmission, such as eavesdropping attack, jamming attack,
denial-of-service attack, spoofing attack, message falsifica-
tion/injection attack, etc. It will be of particular importance to
develop new techniques to jointly defend against hybrid wire-
less attacks [14]. On the other hand, great difficulties result
from the intelligent adversaries that not only can efficiently
collaborate with each other and actively manipulate propaga-
tion environment for attacks, but also can autonomously learn
the knowledge of the associated wireless network to find its
weakness and then to implement adaptive attacks. Therefore, it
is challenging to develop well-performing secure mechanisms
to defend against the intelligent adversaries.
C. The Influences of Hardware Impairments
Hardware impairments are nonnegligible factors which
should also be taken into account in physical layer security.
So far, a great deal of works on the designs of security
strategies assume that the transceiver hardware is perfect.
However, hardware impairments truly exist in practice, due
to nonlinear power amplifiers, in-phase and quadrature (I/Q)
imbalance, frequency and phase offsets, quantization noise,
and synchronization errors [283]. For instance, I/Q imbalance
can attenuate the amplitude and rotate the phase of the desired
constellation, while it can create an additional signal from
the mirror subcarrier which leads to a symbol error rate. In
the presence of nonlinearities of power amplifiers, the bit
error rate may increases remarkably compared to linear power
amplifiers [284]. Although the deleterious impacts of hardware
impairments on the security performance can be mitigated by
calibration and compensation algorithms, residual distortions
at the transceivers are inevitable [283].
Many unknown challenges may be caused by hardware
impairments in the fifth generation (5G) and beyond networks
where novel physical layer technologies will be deployed,
such as the technologies of massive MIMO, mm-Wave, and
full duplex. In massive MIMO systems, additional challenges
root in decreasing the hardware cost and increasing the power
efficiency on antenna array which rise to hardware impair-
ments. Moreover, due to the very large size of antenna array,
standard algorithms for hardware impairment compensation,
such as digital predistortion and phase-noise estimation and
compensation may be too complex in a massive MIMO system
[285]. The mm-Wave technologies utilize high frequency of
mm-Wave band, ranging from 3 ∼ 300 GHz. Due to the
very small wavelength, the mm-Wave networks are different
from the conventional microwave networks in the following
ways: large number of antennas, sensitivity to blockages, and
variable propagation laws, which may deteriorate the harmful
influence of hardware impairments to secure transmissions. In
full duplex systems where the information is exchanged on the
same frequency and time slot, the residual self-interference is
still remained due to the impairments of hardware interfer-
ence suppression methods, and signal processing technologies
are needed to be addressed to suppress the residual self-
interference thoroughly. In addition to those challenges men-
tioned above, in some infrastructureless networks and low-
end networks (such as some specific scenarios in IoT) in
which the communication equipments may be low-cost with
small battery capacity, the hardware impairments may be more
severe issues for implementing physical layer security.
D. The Joint Designs of Physical Layer Security and Classic
Cryptographic Security
Some efforts may be needed for seeking deep insights into
physical layer security and classic cryptographic security. In
future, 5G network and beyond require ultra-strong security
to support extremely secure service. Classic cryptographic
security at the high cost of computational complexity, is
usually deployed at the higher layers of protocol stack. As
an alternative security technology, physical layer security has
the advantages of lower complexity and resource savings. Any
single security technology may not satisfy the demands of
high security in future. Therefore, a natural question is how to
jointly exploit the advantages of the two security technologies.
Then, the cross-layer analysis and design combined with
physical layer security and classic cryptographic security come
naturally to mind to provide a comprehensive security solution
from each layer of protocol stack.
To this end, there are many challenging problems needed
to be solved in this direction, such as the secure network
framework, secure coding scheme, secure network protocol,
hybrid encryption algorithm, and so on. In future, the network
architecture presents heterogeneous features, where the com-
munication nodes are deployed with dissimilar characteristics
such as computing capacity, energy supply capacity, radio
access technologies, protocol stack architecture, etc. This
requires that the joint security strategy designs can adapt to the
heterogeneous architecture of networks, the variety of nodes,
and the diversification of radio access technologies. This is
significant but challenging work, since a joint security scheme
for high level secrecy is usually followed with extremely
high complexity which may limit its practical application.
Moreover, the joint security scheme is expected to have a good
scalability which allows the minimum amount of recomputa-
tion to update protocol parameters if some components of a
network are changed. Therefore, in practice, how to design a
simple but well-performing joint security scheme to tradeoff
between the performance and the complexity is an urgent need
to be addressed.
E. The Global Optimization with Security, Reliability, and
Throughput
To achieve the optimal network performance and user
experience in a wireless network, the security, reliability, and
throughput should be considered jointly in system designs
[14]. However, in many existing works, these performance
metrics are taken into account individually and separately
to reduce the difficulty in system designs. Consequently,
the proposed security mechanisms are potentially suboptimal,
since the three factors interact with each other. For instance
[14], the reliability and throughput of the legitimate channel
can be improved by increasing the transmission power which
however may improve the capacity of wiretap channel and
increase the probability of successful eavesdropping. Likewise,
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although we can increase the coding rate at the transmitter
for improving the security level while reducing the intercept
probability, this leads to a decrease in transmission reliability,
since higher coding rate may increase the outage probability
of legitimate channel.
In order to achieve the near-perfect system performance,
the global optimization with the joint considerations of se-
curity, reliability and throughput is needed to be carried out,
which may be challenging and intractable. For formulating
and solving such complicated multi-objective problems, some
convex/nonconvex optimization techniques and game theory,
as well as stochastic geometry, will be widely applied in
this field [26], [138]. Furthermore, the EE of a network
attracts increasing concerns at present and in future. When
the requirement of EE is imposed on the global optimization
discussed above, the secure transmission designs will be
extremely complicated work which calls for innovative efforts
to develop novel optimization theories and technologies.
F. The Commercial Application of Physical Layer Security
It is largely unexplored to apply the technologies of physical
layer security into commercial wireless networks. In fact, the
most research work on physical layer security still stays at
the theory stage. The opportunities of applying physical layer
security into real commercial networks will be quite rich while
following numerous difficulties and challenges that are from
not only the technical flaws of the proposed secure strategies
but also the limitations of existing network architecture and
technologies, such as the hurdles from the applicability of
existing network framework, the expansibility of underlying
air interface, and the constraints of network resources [10].
Some new technical challenges will also be raised when
physical layer security are applied into the burgeoning wireless
networks, such as high-speed mobile networks, device to
device communications, cognitive radio networks, and IoT.
For example, in high-speed mobile networks as representative
Internet of Vehicles and railway communication systems, the
rapid changes of wireless channels and terminal positions
require to propose fast CSI evaluation schemes and dynamic
authentication frameworks. In device to device communica-
tions, due to direct communications between two mobile users
without the supports of base stations or core networks, it is
more difficult to establish a secure and reliable connection.
Cognitive radio technique, as a promising technique to allevi-
ate spectrum scarcity, has inherent vulnerabilities in physical
layer spectrum sensing, such as the harmful interference from
secondary users and the impersonation attack of disguised
secondary users. To detect the disguised secondary users and
to mitigate secondary interference, the terminals in cognitive
radio networks should have the ability of autonomous learning.
Machine learning is a powerful tool that can bring inspirations
to cope with the potential challenges. IoT has a lot of particular
characteristics, such as a massive number of devices, low-cost
hardware, limited battery capacity, weak computation ability,
and distinct service scenarios, all of which bring unprece-
dented challenges in implementing physical layer security.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
It is believed that physical layer security is a promising
technology to strengthen the secrecy of confidential informa-
tion delivery in many emerging wireless networks in which the
information security has not been well solved by the conven-
tional cryptographic methods. To understand the advantages
of physical layer security, a comparison is first made between
this security technology and the conventional cryptographic
encryption. Then, the survey mainly focuses on providing
a comprehensive overview on the optimization and design
of physical-layer security transmission. The typical wiretap
channel models are introduced to cover common scenarios
and systems in physical layer security. The research topics
in this field are summarized from secure resource allocation,
beamforming/precoding, and antenna/node selection and co-
operation. Towards these research topics, we then discuss the
performance metrics and fundamental optimization problems
raised in the system optimization and design, which involve
the secrecy rate/capacity, secrecy outage probability/capacity,
power/energy consumption, and secure EE. The practical
significance and applied scenarios of the metrics are also
investigated in the survey. Each research topic of physical-
layer security designs involves using these performance met-
rics to formulate optimization problems according to specific
application conditions. Thereafter, the state of the art of
optimization and design in physical layer security is reviewed
from the perspectives of the aforementioned research topics.
In each research topic, the great efforts are presented from
four categories of fundamental optimization problems, such
as maximization of achievable secrecy rate, minimization of
secrecy outrage probability, minimization of power consump-
tion, and maximization of secure EE. Numerous optimization
approaches and solution schemes are investigated in the survey
to tackle different problems in security designs.
One of the major issues in the physical-layer security
designs is the imperfect CSI problem. To achieve the optimal
performance of system designs, the transmitters need to know
the CSI of both the legitimate users and the eavesdroppers.
However, in practice, getting the perfect CSI of the eavesdrop-
pers is very difficult or even impossible. This problem exists
in all research topics of physical-layer security designs. In the
survey, we review the existing assumptions of CSI which have
been considered in physical layer security, while we discuss
three ways to characterize the uncertainties of the imperfect
eavesdropper’s CSI. It is observed that, to cope with the
problems of the imperfect or unknown CSI of eavesdroppers,
the robust security designs, probabilistic view of security, or
QoS-based optimization is usually considered in physical layer
security to get a compromise solution. In addition, we discuss
possible future trends and open challenges from the aspects
involving the problems of imperfect CSI, eavesdropper mod-
els, and hardware impairments, as well as cross-layer security
designs, global performance optimizations, and commercial
application of physical layer security.
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